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During the last forty years, economics of innovation has emerged as a distinct
area of enquiry at the crossing of the economics of growth, industrial organiza-
tion, regional economics, and the theory of the firm. It became a well identified
area of competence in economics specializing not only in the analysis of the effects
of the introduction of new technologies, but also and mainly in understanding
technological change as an endogenous process. As the result of the interpreta-
tion, elaboration, and evolution of different fields of analysis in economic theory,
innovation is viewed as a complex, path dependent process characterized by the
interdependence and interaction of a variety of heterogeneous agents.
Several features of a complex industrial innovation system deserve greater atten-
tion in economics. First, the firms are characterized by distinctive and specific
characteristics as well as being intrinsically heterogeneous. Second, there are
many levels of organization and interaction in an economy. Therefore, behav-
iors, actions, strategies, products at one level typically serve as “building blocks”
for constructing units at the next higher level. The overall organization is hi-
erarchical, with many sorts of tangling interactions (associations, channels of
communication) across levels.
This dissertation presents a structural analysis of the heterogeneity of innovative,
collaborative, and productive behaviors of firms. Both innovation and production
processes, as well as the formation of R&D collaborations, constitute a challenge
for the researcher, as they are interconnected black boxes: labor, materials, and
1
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capital, or R&D expenditure and knowledge spillovers entering as inputs from one
side, and (innovative) sales, or cooperation strategies, as output resulting from
the other. In this context, formulating the accurate measure of productivity is
key to assess how efficiently a firm is turning inputs into outputs. Furthermore,
the level of efficiency of a firm is affected by a complex set of factors: absorptive
capacity, innovativeness, investments in R&D, exporting decisions, and so forth.
These factors are, in turn, determined by research networks, labor skills, and the
social embeddedness of firms routines and strategies.
The main body of the thesis consists of three empirical essays.
Chapter 2 investigates the potential benefits associated with the presence of
unions in terms of productivity growth. Theoretically, the presence of trade
unions is arising from the asymmetry in contracting between individual workers
and employers. However, the absence of unions may not correspond to an under-
lying perfectly competitive situation in the labor market. Instead, it may lead to
market imperfections on the labor demand side in the form of monopsony, that
is, a situation in which there is only one buyer of the labor services. Addition-
ally, firms in some industries may pay workers more than the going market rate
to attract new ones. Hence, policy makers, whose objective is to establish and
maintain a perfectly competitive labor market, seek for policies designed to free
up the demand side of the market. The presence of unions in such circumstances
may offer a second-best alternative to free competition. Moreover, the potential
benefits associated with the presence of unions in the form of “voice” through
which the employees can express their grievances without having to leave the firm
, should be counted against the costs due to misallocation effects. As a matter of
fact, unions can contribute positively to the productivity of a firm, by facilitating
the communication between labor force and management, drawing the attention
of the latter to changes in working methods or production techniques that may
be beneficial to both parties.
There exist abundant theoretical arguments for both positive and negative effects
of trade unions on productivity, but data appropriate for investigating the ques-
tion are generally lacking. In particular, data for union versus nonunion labor
are not available, and even unionization data are highly aggregated. Therefore,
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we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of unions on total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth that does not rely on individual worker data, but on
firm-level data. In particular, we rely on the framework of production function
to estimate simultaneously price-cost markups and wage markups.
In Chapter 3, we analyze the correlation among different R&D alliances due
to both firm- and sector-level heterogeneity, adopting a multivariate hierarchical
logit model. The advantage of adopting a hierarchical structure (often referred
to as multilevel, random or mixed) is that we can control for a richer variance
structure that describes the expected correlation present among firms’ cooper-
ative choices within a particular sector. In fact, when exploring the differences
in the factors affecting the firms’ probability to establish different types of coop-
eration, namely horizontal cooperation (with competitors), vertical cooperation
(with suppliers or customers), and institutional cooperation (with universities
and research institutes), the existing literature on the determinants of R&D co-
operation with different R&D partners overlooks the role of sectoral specificities
(for example, sector-specific physical assets) in influencing the expected corre-
lation among the different cooperative strategies present among firms within a
particular sector. As a matter of fact, horizontal R&D cooperations are likely to
be formed within the same sector as it will lead to collective efficiencies (Schmitz,
1999) in the form of reduced transaction costs and accelerated innovation rates
through a greater market access. These collective efficiencies are of particular
interest from a policy perspective. In fact, they can be interpreted as the mul-
tiplier effect of an innovation policy: the increased innovative intensity of one
company or several companies multiplies the economic benefits in a given sector
by helping to drive the innovative intensity of other business entities. This type
of externality is demand-driven, in the sense that the private and public for inno-
vation can be stimulated by new or growing business enterprises, which enables
their suppliers to grow as well.
Our approach departs from the one used to test for complementarities (Mohnen
and Roller, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2006), as our main focus is not to estimate the
degree of strategic complementarities or substitutabilities among firms’ cooper-
ation choices, but rather to model and estimate both individual and aggregate
forms of externalities, in which the collective actions of a reference group affect
an individual’s choices. As pointed out by Mohnen and Roller (2005), innovation
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policies may have different impacts on the distinctive phases of the innovation
process. As a matter of fact, while there could be firm-level policy externalities
in the decision to collaborate in research, the innovative produce might well be
affected by the aforementioned demand driven innovation policy externality.
Therefore, to explicitly take into account both firm- and sector-level externalities,
and the different impact of innovation policy measures on the two phases of
the innovative process, we divide our study in two stage. In the first stage we
study the main drivers of undertaking a collaborative agreement with a research
partner. In the second stage, we investigate the effects of innovation policies and
R&D cooperation on innovative intensity.
Our hypothesis of a heterogeneity across firms and sectors is confirmed by the
results. All covariances are found to be significant. In other words, firms within
the same industry share similar characteristics (same random effects), which lead
to correlation between research partners’ choices.
In Chapter 4, we construct a model where firms invest in R&D activities with
or without a research partner to improve their productivity levels. In particular,
we develop and estimate a structural dynamic monopoly model to quantify the
linkages between R&D spending, innovation and cooperation investment choices,
and endogenous productivity. To our knowledge, our paper constitutes the first
attempt to explicitly model the different collaborative R&D investment deci-
sions adopting a dynamic structural framework. Differently from these studies,
the model we propose derives the firms’ optimal R&D investment decisions where
these depend on the past R&D activities and on the past level of productivity.
Additionally, within the suggested framework we are able to model and retrieve
the current fixed or sunk costs relative to the different (collaborative) R&D ac-
tivities.
Merging data on sales and factor inputs of Dutch manufacturing firms extracted
from the Production Survey (PS), and three waves of the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) for the Netherlands, covering the period from 2002 to 2008, we find
that the firm’s probability to do R&D or to introduce an innovation increases
with the level of productivity, only when this activity is shared with a research
partner. Moreover, past investments in cooperative research have a positive im-
pact on current productivity, which, in turn, positively influences the probability
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to engage in both R&D and innovation when these activities are shared with a
research partner. Therefore, innovation policy measures targeting cooperation
might result in a virtuous cycle.
Moreover, according to the literature on R&D cooperation, the costs of innovat-
ing are smaller when cooperating. In fact, given the higher risks associated with
the uncertainty of the market demand for new products or processes, the firm
might allocate more importance to the cost/risk sharing rationale for this type




imperfect competition in output
and labor markets
Joint work with B. Melenberg, J.E. Plasmans, and M. Vancauteren
Abstract. This paper examines the interaction between product and labor
market imperfections and the impact of these imperfections on total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) growth. We contribute to the existing literature in several ways.
First, we link the empirical research on production functions and the market im-
perfections literature, providing empirical evidence of the imperfect competition
on both product and labor markets. In particular, we present a new way to model
how firms deal with output and labor rigidities, and, at the same time, we ad-
dress potential endogeneity issues including measurement errors in output, and
highly correlated factor inputs. We review up–to–date estimation approaches,
and confront the validity of the different assumptions in identifying the produc-
tion function parameters. Second, we consider the role of adjustment frictions in
materials in solving the identification issue due the collinearity among productive
inputs. Third, using a firm-level dataset of 21 Dutch manufacturing industries
over the period 1989–2008, we consider to what extent the estimated productivity
is sensitive to the different model specifications and to the different econometric
approaches.
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2.1 Introduction
Theoretically, the presence of trade unions is arising from the asymmetry in
contracting between individual workers and employers. The alternative to a
unionized labor market is one characterized by a perfectly competitive structure
that ensures the workers to choose whether or not to work by comparing the given
perfectly competitive wage with the marginal utility of not working. However,
the absence of unions may not correspond to an underlying perfectly competitive
situation in the labor market. Instead, it may lead to market imperfections on the
labor demand side in the form of monopsony, that is, a situation in which there is
only one buyer of the labor services. Additionally, firms in some industries may
pay workers more than the going market rate to attract new ones. Hence, policy
makers, whose objective is to establish and maintain a perfectly competitive labor
market, seek for policies designed to free up the demand side of the market. The
presence of unions in such circumstances may offer a second-best alternative to
free competition. Moreover, the potential benefits associated with the presence
of unions in the form of “voice”1 should be counted against the costs due to
misallocation effects. As a matter of fact, unions can contribute positively to the
productivity of a firm, by facilitating the communication between labor force and
management, drawing the attention of the latter to changes in working methods
or production techniques that may be beneficial to both parties.
There exist abundant theoretical arguments for both positive and negative effects
of trade unions on productivity, but data appropriate for investigating the ques-
tion are generally lacking. In particular, data for union versus nonunion labor
are not available, and even unionization data are highly aggregated. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of unions on pro-
ductivity growth that does not rely on individual worker data, but on firm-level
data. In particular, we rely on the framework of production function to esti-
mate simultaneously price-cost markups and wage markups. To our knowledge,
this study is the first attempt of estimating simultaneously wage and product
markups, and productivity growth, adopting a production function framework.
1A source of empowerment through which the employees can express their grievances with-
out having to leave the firm (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008)
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Within the production function framework, the econometric literature has fo-
cused on some important econometric issues that need to be dealt with when
estimating such functions at the firm level. A first econometric issue, broadly
known as simultaneity, is the potential correlation between unobserved produc-
tivity shocks and the input factors. A second problem arises from measurement
errors in output or inputs. Typically, we observe deflated measures in place of
the original physical quantities. This leads to two kinds of problems: the first is
associated with endogeneity and the second concerns the correct identification of
firm–specific productivity measures. The endogeneity problem is due to the po-
tential correlation between unobservable firm-level (input and output) price vari-
ations and input choices (Klette and Griliches, 1996; Ornaghi, 2008; De Loecker,
2011). The productivity measurement identification issue is deriving from the
fact that neglecting the variation in factor prices leads to the estimation of per-
formance measures that are indices of revenue per unit input expenditure, rather
than measures of efficiency (Katayama et al., 2009). Another problem concerns
the highly correlated factor inputs. In fact, if inputs are chosen optimally with
no adjustment costs or frictions, the input levels are perfectly dependent of each
other (the “collinearity problem”). This collinearity issue may pose a problem
especially for some estimators which rely on a control function approach of pro-
duction function parameters (see Gandhi et al. (2011), Wooldridge (2009), and
Ackerberg et al. (2006)’s critique on both Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003)). Lastly, some specific functional form assumptions can be
more appropriate than others, due to, for example, the particular type of labor
market.
Parallel to the econometric literature, two other strands of research focus on
market imperfections. One is the literature on output market imperfect compe-
tition which follows the lead of the seminal papers of Hall (1986, 1988, 1991).
The other strand, led by McDonald and Solow (1981), focuses on imperfections
in labor markets due to unionization.
Only a few studies empirically investigate the possibility of having imperfect
competition in both product and labor factor markets. Among others, Bughin
(1993, 1996), Crépon et al. (2002), Dobbelaere (2004), Gaĺı et al. (2007), Abra-
ham et al. (2009), and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011), consider the possibility
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of imperfections in both product and factor markets, by taking into account the
fact that wages are no longer exogenous.
Bughin (1993), studying the Belgian chemical industry (and four Belgian manu-
facturing sectors, Bughin (1996)), considers imperfections in product and factor
markets, but does not provide insights about the unobserved productivity. More-
over, he does not consider possible endogeneity issues tailored to the selection
bias (due to the omission of firms’ entry and exit). Also in Crépon et al. (2002),
Dobbelaere (2004), and in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011), the main focus is the
heterogeneity in price–cost markup and workers bargaining power parameters,
rather than on productivity and endogeneity issues. Abraham et al. (2009), using
Belgian firm–level data, simultaneously estimate price–cost margins and union
bargaining power to analyze how price setting and bargaining power is affected
by globalization. Although Abraham et al. (2009) apply the Olley and Pakes
(1996) method to deal with the simultaneity issue, they do not correct for the
unavailability of physical output volumes, replacing the volumes of productions
with deflated firm-level sales. The omission of the output price might lead to
correlation between the input choices and the productivity shock, yielding biased
estimated coefficients.
Next to the main contribution of assessing the impact of unions’ power on pro-
ductivity growth, this paper bridges the gap between the empirical research on
production functions and the market imperfections literature. We provide a way
to model how firms deal with output and labor market rigidities, and, at the
same time, we address the potential endogeneity issues concerning the simul-
taneity, the collinearity of inputs, and the omitted output price biases. Second,
we consider to what extent the estimated unobserved productivity is sensitive to
the different model specifications and to the different econometric approaches to
identify the structural parameters of the model. Third, we provide further em-
pirical evidence of the imperfect competition on the product and labor markets
using up–to–date estimation approaches.
In particular, using a firm-level dataset of 21 Dutch manufacturing industries
over the period 1989–2008, we show that, neglecting a wage markup, therefore
assuming that firms are setting the marginal revenue product of labor equal to
the labor’s marginal cost, leads to an underestimation of the true value of the
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price–cost margin at the aggregate level. Depending on the estimation approach,
the underestimation of the product markups is significant and varies between
7% and 16%. The workers’ bargaining power parameters range between 0.191
and 0.482. These results, except for the within estimator, are consistent with
the trade union density/unemployment rate ratio reported for the Netherlands.
Along with the bargaining parameter, we are able to provide, within the deflated
revenue production function framework, an estimate of the wage markup. The
wage markup estimates fluctuates between 21.9% and 23.7%. These results are
comparable with Aidt and Tzannatos (2008)’s review of wage markups in high–
income economies, which are between 0 and 25%.
In line with the literature, we find that omitting output prices yields downward
biased input elasticity coefficients. We then confirm the hypothesis of sectoral
specificity as suggested by Ramey and Shapiro (2001), namely, sectoral speci-
ficity concerning physical capital, which is costly to redeploy, sectoral nature of
the local labor markets, workforce training institutions, and financial institu-
tions. Indeed, testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity across sectors yields the
conclusion that all the structural parameters significantly differ from sector to
sector, and are sensitive to the estimation technique.
Moreover, we find that the underestimation of the product markups derives from
a computational bias of the true level of the output markup, possibly caused by
the misspecification of the marginal costs, as we are omitting the direct effects of
wage rigidities. Therefore, firms share their monopoly rents with labor unions.
Concerning the impact of different estimation approaches and model assumptions
on the firm-level productivity, with each estimation approach, we find evidence
of a positive time trend only when we consider both labor and product market
imperfections.
We find that correcting for the omitted output prices leads to decreases of the
TFPG percentage rates, and, independently from the estimation technique used,
when assuming both bargaining on the labor market and imperfect competition
on the output market, we find larger TFPG rates. With both IV and Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) estimation of the TFP growth we find a significant and pos-
itive relation between productivity growth and the bargaining parameter. The
economic benefits of unions could be found in the worker–manager cooperation.
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Indeed, unions can increase firms’ productivity by “shocking” the management
into better production practices (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate
a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) that allows for both output and
labor market power. Section 3 reviews the main estimation techniques. Section 4
describes the data and results on the relevant structural parameters are reported
in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the results for the TFP measure. In the
final section we conclude.
2.2 The model: Building blocks
2.2.1 The standard setting
As in Ackerberg et al. (2007), the starting point is a Cobb-Douglas production









where Kit denotes capital, Lit labor, and Mit intermediate goods, consisting of
materials and energy, for firm i at period t. Ait represents the Hicksian neutral
efficiency level of firm i at time t, and is defined as Total Factor Productiv-
ity2(TFP). θiKt, θiLt, θiMt are firms’ elasticities of output with respect to capital,
labor, and intermediate goods, respectively. Taking natural logs of (4.2) results
in a linear function,
qit = θ0 + θiKtkit + θiLtlit + θiMtmit + ait (2.2)
where lower-case letters refer to natural logarithms. The logarithm of Ait is de-
fined as log(Ait) ≡ θ0+ait, where θ0 measures the mean productivity level across
firms and over time, while ait is the productivity shock which is observable by
2MFP (Multi-Factor Productivity) is sometimes used interchangeably with TFP, even if
there is a slight difference between what they may include. Indeed, taking into account all the
factors influencing output levels can be unrealistic, therefore MFP may be a more appropriate
term to use. However, the term TFP continues to be used more widely.
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the firm (for example, managerial ability, quality of research), but unobservable
to the econometrician, hence a source of potential endogeneity.
The time-varying, input-dependent elasticity of scale θit is defined as the sum of












2.2.2 Imperfect output market competition: considering
the omitted prices
As we observe deflated gross output, input coefficients might be biased if firm-
level price variation is correlated with input choice. To see this, we can express
the deflated gross output as Yit ≡
Qit(Pit)Pit
P jt
exp (uyit), where Pit is the price of
firm i at time t, P jt is the industry j (≡ j(i)) price index, and u
y
it represents
measurement error in Yit. In logs, we have:





Substituting equation (2.2) into (2.3), and taking yit as dependent variable, the
unobserved firm-level price deviations (pit−p
j
t ) will enter the production function
as an extra error component. This will introduce potential correlation with
the input choices, if E(xit(pit − p
j
t )) 6= 0, where xit ≡ (lit, kit, mit)
′, possibly
yielding biased input coefficients (Klette and Griliches, 1996; De Loecker, 2011).
In order to estimate the production function consistently, without information
on establishment-level prices, we proceed by imposing some structure on the
demand system (Foster et al., 2008).
Following Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2011), a simple conditional
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where Qjt is the sector j production index,
3 and udit is an idiosyncratic firm-
specific demand shock. Moreover, assuming that consumers have an unbounded
taste for variety, it is reasonable to assume that every firm will produce a distinct
variety, and that the aggregate production index is, and ηj is the price elasticity
of demand for differentiated goods in sector j. Taking logarithms, we can write












Taking into account the demand (2.5), the log deflated output (2.3) can be ex-
pressed as















= ηj/(1 + ηj),
4 where ηj < −1, the deflated gross output can be
written as:
yit = γi0t + γiKtkit + γiMtmit + γiLtlit −
1
ηj
qjt + ãit + ũit, (2.7)
where γi0t ≡ θ0/µj, γikt ≡ θikt/µj, k = K,L,M are the input factor elasticities,









demand shock and ũyit is the measurement error in yit.
By introducing a firm’s demand system when modeling a production function,
we are able to decompose the traditional measured productivity gains into real
productivity gains, ait, an idiosyncratic firm–specific demand shock, u
d
it and a
measurement error, uyit. Moreover, as in Klette and Griliches (1996), we derive an
expression for deflated revenue in an imperfectly competitive framework, where
it is possible to obtain an estimate of the demand elasticity ηj , by simply adding
industry output as an additional regressor to proxy for unobserved firm–level
3We assume the aggregate production index to be exogenous and independent from the
output produced by firm i, in other words, ∂Qjt/∂Qit = 0, ∀t.
4In case of perfect competition, the cross price elasticity tends to minus infinity and the
markup goes to one.
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prices.5 The advantage of this structural approach consists in estimating the
production function coefficients, controlling for price and demand variation. In
this way, we get rid of the potential correlation between measured productivity
and all those factors that might have an impact on prices and demand, but
are not related to the true productivity (for example, in open economies, real
exchange rate appreciation pulls down the output prices of the tradeable goods).
2.2.3 Labor market rigidities: union bargaining power
In this section, we relax the conventional assumption of perfect competition in
the labor market, allowing both firms and workers’ union to have some market
power.
Many authors have studied the influence of market power of unions, by introduc-
ing wage rigidities through efficiency wages. For instance, Hall (1991), following
McDonald and Solow (1981), assumes that the firm wages and level of employ-
ment are jointly determined according to an efficient bargaining scheme between
the firm and its workers. In this case, the wage of workers is determined at a
level which is higher than the firm’s marginal revenue of labor. Workers in firms
with some degree of market power on the output market can earn wages that are
much higher than the competitive industry wage level.
The workers in the firm bargain with the firm over both the levels of employment
and of the wage. In particular, the workers’ objective is specified as the union’s
aggregate gain to the workers from membership, Uit(Wit, Lit) ≡ Lit(Wit −W it),
where W it is the reservation wage (i.e., the theoretical wage valid on an imper-
fectly competitive output market and a perfectly competitive labor market), and
5This model has been first proposed by Klette and Griliches (1996), but De Loecker (2011)
was the first to implement correction for output market imperfection into the semi–parametric
estimation framework introduced by Olley and Pakes (1996).
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Wit is the negotiated wage.
6 The standard static firm’s objective is to maximize
its short-run profit, Πit, given by the difference between the total revenue and
the total costs, Πit ≡ Pit(Qit)Qit −WitLit − RitKit − ZitMit. We assume that
there are adjustment frictions in both the capital and material markets, where
the capital and material input levels are held fixed for a time period, and the
maximization of Πit with respect to Kit and to Mit yields the trivial solution of
marginal product of such inputs equal to zero.
The efficient bargaining model can be written as a weighted average of the loga-
rithms of workers’ aggregate gain from union membership and the firm’s profit:
max
Wit,Lit,Kit,Mit
[φit log(Uit(Wit, Lit)) + (1− φit) logΠit] ,
where φit ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of union bargaining power. The maximization
of the union is with respect to the negotiated wage Wit and labor Lit, but also
possibly with respect to the factor inputs Kit and Mit, depending on whether
one asumes these to be flexible or not. The (relevant part of the) FOCs of this
problem can be written as:





















From (4.21) it follows that, when φit = 0, the marginal revenue product of labor
is equal to the wage rate. However, in general, with φit ∈ (0, 1), by rewriting
equation (4.22), we can express the bargained wage rate as a function of the
6According to McDonald and Solow (1981) the workers’ objective in their efficient bar-
gaining model can be specified in two alternative ways: either as the union’s aggregate
gain to the workers from membership, or taking account of the unemployment benefits, as
LitWit +W it(Nit −Lit), where Nit is the labor supply. McDonald and Solow (1981) judge the
first specification as the most appropriate one for real life. In fact, in the second specification,
if W it falls, the firm would have to increase its wage offer to make up for a reduction in W it, to
keep the level of union utility unchanged. Hence, we advocate McDonald and Solow (1981)’s
suggestion and take the union preferences Uit(Wit, Lit) ≡ Lit(Wit −W it) as a function of both
wages and employment.
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as the wage markup, one can see how this is directly
depending on the union’s bargaining power. Equation (2.10) summarizes the
features of the efficient bargaining model. The wage wedgeWit−W it is increasing
with the bargaining power φit and with firm performance, measured as profit per
employee Πit/Lit. The profit per employee is a good measure of firm performance,
as it proxies for earnings on intangible assets, such as knowledge, reputation, and
collaboration created by talented workers (Bryan, 2007).
Combining equations (4.21) and (4.22), we can write the marginal revenue prod-







= W it. (2.11)
Therefore, by multiplying both sides of (4.23) by Lit
Qit
, and using the definitions
of θiLt and µj , we can derive












with siLt the labor share in total production. Thus, under imperfect competition
in both output and labor market, the labor elasticity is a function of the labor
share and the wage markup:
γiLt = siLt(1− µ
W
it ). (2.12)
At this stage, it is intuitively clear how the exclusion of frictions in the labor
market (i.e., φit = 0 orWit = W it) might lead to misestimating the firm’s market
power. When there is no imperfect competition in the labor market, firms set
the wage at the lowest value possible, ultimately equal to the competitive wage,
i.e., Wit = W it (and, therefore, µ
W
it = 0). For Wit that tends to W it, the wage
markup decreases, given that the elasticity and the share of labor are constant,
which is inversely related to the output markup µj .
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This apparently direct positive relationship between the wage and the product
price markup could be interpreted as if the larger the firm’s rent, the larger the
wage markup (as in Dobbelaere (2004)). However, according to our analysis, it
might be just an underestimation of the true level of price–cost margins that is
caused by the omission of direct effects of the wage bill on marginal costs (Bughin,
1993). As a matter of fact, finding a significant estimate for the wage markup
parameter µWit means that the workers’ union has a degree of bargaining power,
φit, which erodes the existing monopoly rents. Therefore, we expect price–cost
margins and bargaining power parameters (both wage markup and bargaining
elasticity) to be negatively related.
Finally, we include the labor elasticity, as expressed in (4.4), in the deflated
revenue function (2.7). The resulting estimating equation assuming labor market
frictions can be expressed as7





qjt + ãit + ũit, (2.13)
b. yit = γi0t + γiKtkit + γiMtmit + γiLtlit −
1
ηj
qjt + ãit + ũit, (2.14)
c. qit = θi0t + θiKtkit + θiMtmit + θiLtlit + ait + u
y
it. (2.15)
Estimating equation b in (2.14) represents the deflated revenue function allowing
for imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition in the
7This functional form allows us to directly obtain an estimate of µWit and c, along with the
estimation of the other regression parameters. As a robustness check, we also specify the labor





, and directly obtain an
estimate of φit1−φit from the following estimating equation:








qjt + ãit + ũit.
The bargaining parameter, φit, in the first specification, and the wage markup, µ
W
it , in the








and standard errors are computed using the delta method. This yields similar empirical results.
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labor market. Specification b could still represents the revenue function of a firm
producing in a unionized labor market where the workers bargain only over the
wage and let the employers determine the level of the employment, i.e., right-to-
manage (Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2011). Specification c in (2.15) represents the
production function in the perfect competition case, and it used as benchmark.
Estimation of equation (2.13) can be done following several estimation approaches,
under appropriate corresponding distributional assumptions, which will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
2.3 Estimation and identification strategies
In this section we briefly review the main problems concerning the estimation of a
production function. Moreover, we discuss the advantages and drawbacks of some
widely adopted estimation techniques, linking them to our structural framework
of imperfect competition. The literature that we are going to investigate does
not necessarily discuss our specification (2.13), but typically the version without
imperfect competition in both output and labor market, i.e., with µWit = 1 and
1/ηj = 0. The corresponding equation is given by
yit = γi0t + γiKtkit + γiMtmit + γiLtlit + ait + uit. (2.16)
In empirical applications one usually assumes that the parameters are constant,
i.e., γikt = γk, for k ∈ {0, K, L,M}, while uit is treated as a usual error term. The
problem is the potential correlation between ait and the inputs that are chosen
at time t, in our case at least lit. Assuming that the unobserved productivity
is constant over time (ait = ai), the potential endogeneity between ai and the
inputs is controlled by exploiting the panel structure of the data, for instance, by
using the fixed-effects estimator. However, if we believe that ai evolves over time
instead, using the fixed effects estimator does not solve the endogeneity problem,
and alternatives have to be investigated.
One natural alternative is the use of an instrumental variables (IV) estimator, if
instruments can be found that are correlated with the inputs, but uncorrelated
with ait and uit. A natural candidate for such instruments are the input prices.
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However, as discussed by Ackerberg et al. (2007), using input prices as instru-
ments has not been uniformly successful in practice. Moreover, assuming market
frictions in the input markets (as we do with respect to the labor market), might
imply correlation between ai and the input prices (in our case wages). Therefore,
other instruments, or other estimation approaches have to be investigated.
2.3.1 Control function estimation approach
In their seminal paper, Olley and Pakes (1996) propose a control function ap-
proach to estimate production functions (which they considered without inter-
mediate goods, and where labor is the only endogenous input). In particular,
Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that the investment level is strictly monotonic in
the scalar unobservable productivity level ait. More precisely, they assume that
investment iit satisfies iit = jt(ait, kit), strictly increasing in ait. It is then pos-
sible to invert the investment demand function. This yields a so-called control
function, expressing productivity as a function of investment, along with other
variables (in their case capital kit): ait = j
−1
t (iit, kit). By substituting out the
unobserved productivity ait using this control function, the resulting equation
does not have endogeneity problems anymore.
However, when inverting the investment function, to guarantee the one-to-one
mapping between firm-level productivity and the observable investment, the in-
vestment variable has to be strictly positive. As investments in the data are
often zero, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also include intermediate goods as ex-
tra endogenous input in the production function. Then they propose the use of
an intermediate input demand function, such as materials and energy demand
functions, as a proxy for unobserved productivity: mit = ft(ait, kit). This yields




In practice, the estimation approach suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is composed of two stages. In the first stage, one
estimates the labor elasticity, along with the substituted replacement function,
which can be approximated by a sufficiently high order polynomial in its argu-
ments. However, due to the nonparametric character of the control function the
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capital and possibly material elasticities cannot be estimated in the first stage.
Thus, in the first stage, focusing on the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach,
one runs a regression
yit = γLlit + φt(mit, kit) + uit, (2.17)
with φt approximated by a higher order polynomial in mit and kit, where φt
satisfies
φt(mit, kit) = γKkit + γMmit + f
−1
t (mit, kit).
In the second stage, to identify the other production function parameters (capital
and material), Olley and Pakes (1996) assume that the technological progress,
ait, depends on the information known by the firm i, at time t− 1 (information
set Iit−1). Under the additional assumption that ait follows a first–order Markov
process, the past realizations of ait constitute the information set. In other words,
ait = h(Iit−1) + ξit = h(ait−1) + ξit, (2.18)
where ξit represents the unanticipated innovative shock to productivity, assumed
to be uncorrelated with material and capital in period t − 1. Using the first
stage estimates from (2.17) and assumption (2.18), we can write the production
function (2.16) as:
yit−γ̂Llit = γ0+γKkit+γMmit+h[φ̂it−1−γ0−γKkit−1−γMmit−1]+ξit+uit, (2.19)
where
φ̂it−1 = φ̂t(mit−1, kit−1). (2.20)
Approximating h(·) with a flexible polynomial, (2.19) can be estimated, using
lagged materials mit−1 as instrument for materials mit, since mit might be cor-
related with ξit.
A restricting assumption of the Olley and Pakes (1996) model concerns the timing
and dynamic nature of inputs, i.e., some inputs are more “dynamic in nature”
than others. In particular, when selecting the state variables that enter the
firm’s expected discounted profit maximization, Olley and Pakes (1996) define
capital as a dynamic input, i.e., its choice of the current period affects the choice
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of the next period. Labor (and in case of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) also
materials), on the other hand, is assumed to be a more flexible and non–dynamic
input, therefore, it is implicitly assumed that there are no labor (and material)
adjustment costs.
2.3.2 Ackerberg et al. (2006) critique and solutions
According to Ackerberg et al. (2006), an important drawback of the Olley and
Pakes (1996) approach in the context of (2.16) arises form collinearity between
labor and the polynomial in material (or investment) and capital. As a matter
of fact, in the first stage, the labor coefficient could be unidentified, if the re-
gressor lit does not have any sample variability that is independent of the other
regressors. To see this, let us consider the approach of Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) which assumes that mit and lit are perfectly flexible inputs, chosen si-
multaneously. In the context of equation (2.16), i.e., under perfect competition
and with kit an inflexible input factor, the firm’s state variables at time t are
given by ait, kit, Pt, Wt, and Zt, where the output price Pt, wage Wt, an the
material price Zt are assumed to be constant over firms (assuming perfect com-
petition in the three markets). The demand of material and labor are then
functions of these state variables, i.e., mit = f(ait, kit, Pt,Wt, Zt) ≡ ft(ait, kit),
and lit = q(ait, kit, Pt,Wt, Zt) ≡ qt(ait, kit). Therefore, they both depend on the
same state variables, ait and kit, and lit = qt(f
−1
t (mit, kit), kit) = st(mit, kit), leav-
ing the labor input as a time-varying function of material and capital. But then
there is no independent firm-level source of variation that could help identify
the labor elasticity coefficient in the first stage. In addition, Ackerberg et al.
(2006) show that these problems remain intact, even if one is able to derive f−1t
explicitly, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function: again, one cannot the
labor elasticity coefficient in the first stage.
Ackerberg et al. (2006) discuss two possible ways to break this collinearity is-
sue. One way is to assume that the firm makes optimization errors only in the
choice of labor (optimization error in material adds an additional unobservable,
violating the scalar unobservability assumption, needed to construct a control
function). This error does not enter the production function and will move lit
around independently of the control function.
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The second option is to make specific timing assumptions that would justify
the independency of cross–sectional variation of lit, conditional on the choices
of materials and capital. In particular, Ackerberg et al. (2006) propose to as-
sume that, next to capital, also labor is a state variable, i.e., not fully flexible,
and that labor is chosen somewhere after the choice of capital (at time t − 1)
and before the choice of materials (at time t). Given this timing assumption,
Ackerberg et al. (2006) proceed with a two–step estimation approach, where the
labor coefficient is identified only in the second stage, together with the capital
coefficients. As estimation approach, Ackerberg et al. (2006) propose to use two
equations, namely, first
yit = γKkit + γMmit + γLlit + g(lit, mit, kit) + uit, (2.21)
with g a polynomial in terms of lit, mit, and kit, and assuming that the expecta-
tion of uit conditional on time t information is equal to zero. The second equation
follows from (2.18), and is given by
g(lit, mit, kit) = h[g(lit−1, mit−1, kit−1)] + ξit, (2.22)
with h a univariate polynomial, and assuming that the expectation of ξit con-
ditional on time t − 1 information is equal to zero. This approach is based on
Wooldridge (2009) in order to obtain efficient GMM estimates and standard er-
rors in one step. In fact, Wooldridge (2009) uses the second equation substituted
in the first one, yielding
yit = γKkit + γMmit + γLlit + h[g(lit−1, mit−1, kit−1)] + ξit + uit, (2.23)
together with the assumption that the expectation of ξit+uit conditional on time
t− 1 information is equal to zero.
2.3.3 Bond and Söderbom (2005) critique and IV solution
Bond and Söderbom (2005) also illustrate the identification issues concerning
the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production function, when these are assumed
to be perfectly flexible. Indeed, when the input prices are common to all firms
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and inputs are chosen optimally with no adjustment frictions, assuming perfect
competition on output and input markets, the levels of the inputs are perfectly
collinear (in the sense of linear regression) with each other and the productivity.
Bond and Söderbom (2005) show how this collinearity problem is not solved
by assuming that one of the inputs, i.e., the level of capital, is predetermined
(chosen in the previous period). According to these authors, the only assumption
that guarantees the identification of the structural parameters is a positive and
exogenous variation in input prices (such as one deriving from adjustment costs).
However, according to Bond and Söderbom (2005), the presence of unobserved
variation across firms in prices might rule out the control function approach,
which is assumed to be common to all firms.
To break the collinearity issue, Bond and Söderbom (2005) consider the dynamic
problem of a firm maximizing the current and future profits in the presence of
firm-specific adjustment costs and productivity shocks. Simulating data for a
two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function, Bond and Söderbom (2005) show
that the production function coefficients are identified provided that there are ad-
justment costs for each input and that these inputs are subject to different levels
of adjustment costs. Given the empirical evidence of the presence of such adjust-
ment costs presence, Bond and Söderbom (2005) suggest the use of instrumental
variables methods to consistently estimate the parameters of the production func-
tion. In particular, the lagged level of inputs constitute informative instruments,
as the presence of cost frictions makes the variation of these inputs persistent.
2.3.4 Gandhi et al. (2011) critique and solution
As later stressed by Gandhi et al. (2011), if one is not willing to assume the pres-
ence of adjustment frictions in all inputs, the nonparametric identification of the
production function fails in the presence of flexible inputs. In particular, Gandhi
et al. (2011) show how, in the perfect competition case, when the material is as-
sumed to be a flexible input, its elasticity suffers from an identification problem
deriving from the fact that there is no source of cross-sectional variation in mit
independent of the firm’s remaining productive inputs (lit, kit, ait). Moreover, ac-
cording to Gandhi et al. (2011) the collinearity problem described by Ackerberg
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et al. (2006) is not solved. To argue this, they consider equation (2.23) of the
Wooldridge (2009) approach, together with the (specialized) moment condition
E(ξit + uit|lit−1, mit−1, kit−1) = 0.
The lagged value mit−1 is intended to act as an instrument for the endogenous
mit. However, mit−1 alone cannot act as an excluded variable and be a valid
instrument for mit, since mit−1 is already included in (2.23) as an additional
regressor, and, moreover, it is fully collinear with lit−1 and kit−1.
Gandhi et al. (2011) propose a solution that identifies the coefficient of a flex-
ible input and is based on a transformation of the firm’s first order condition
for flexible inputs, i.e., material. The key idea behind their approach is to com-
bine the transformation of the FOC for material with the idea of measurement
error in output (unanticipated productivity shock). In particular, they obtain
a simple “share regression” model, log(siMt) = log(θM)− u
q
it, and perform non-
parametric regression of log(siMt) on all inputs levels (since log(θM) depends on
all productive inputs). Since the ex-post shock, uqit, is assumed to be independent
of the three inputs, the non-parametric share regression identifies both material
elasticity and uqit.
2.3.5 Estimation using market imperfections
In this subsection we describe and motivate our three estimation approaches, also
referring to the discussion in the previous subsections. Our starting point is equa-
tion (2.13), assuming that the structural parameters are drawn from probability
distributions that do not vary over firms or time, i.e., the resulting estimation
equation is




qjt + ãit + ũit. (2.24)
In our specification, at least, lit is fully flexible. According to Bond and Söderbom
(2005) this might result in perfect collinearity in a Cobb-Douglas production
framework under perfect competition in output and input markets. However, due
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to the imposed market imperfections, we do not have this collinearity problem.
First, as independent variable we do not have lit in equation (2.24), but siLtlit.
Second, lit has to satisfy (4.21)–(4.22), avoiding that lit depends in a linear way
on ãit and the other inputs, as derived by Bond and Söderbom (2005) in the
perfect competition case. Moreover, if kit, mit, or both are fully flexible as well,
then (4.21)–(4.22) will again avoid perfect collinearity.
Next, we describe our estimation approaches, in combination with the corre-
sponding additional distributional assumptions. As first estimation approach,
we shall use the fixed effects (or within) estimator, which requires as additional
assumption that ãit is not time dependent, i.e., ãit = ãt.
As second estimator, we shall use Wooldridge (2009)’s estimator related to the
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) control function approach. In this case we add
(2.18), together with the assumption that ξit has mean zero, conditional on all
time t − 1 information. To be able to apply the control function approach, we
“derive” ãit as a (nonlinear) function of the inputs lit, kit, and mit, and the
state variables, using our set-up. When doing this, the collinearity problems
described by Ackerberg et al. (2006) for the Cobb-Douglas production function
do not show up, due to the market imperfections. Moreover, the assumption
that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas production function avoids the
nonparametric identification problems raised by Gandhi et al. (2011). However,
we have to assume that ãit is only a (nonlinear) function of the inputs lit, kit, and
mit, constant over firms an time. We then use (2.23), updated to our specification,
i.e.,




qjt + h[g(lit−1, mit−1, kit−1)] + ξit + ˜̃uit,
(2.25)
together with the distributional assumption that ξit + ˜̃uit has mean zero, condi-
tional on all information at time t−1. We estimate (2.25), with g and h specified
as third order polynomials, and using as instruments the lagged inputs lit−1, kit−1,
mit−1, and their higher order and interaction terms, up to the third order. This
choice of instruments in particular makes sense if there is some persistence over
time in the inputs, for instance, via kit. Given persistence in kit, there will also
be persistence in the other inputs, due to the (nonlinear) dependence between
the inputs.
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As third estimation approach, we shall use the IV estimator. Here, we use (2.24),
and make the assumption that ãit+ ˜̃uit has mean zero, conditional on all informa-
tion available at time t−1. We estimate (2.24), using GMM, with as instruments
the first and second order lags of lit, kit, and mit. Again, given persistence in,
for instance, kit, there will also be persistence in the other inputs, making that
the lagged inputs are correlated with the current inputs. However, although
the IV approach has the advantage that it does not require the assumption of a
control function, constant over firms and time, the cost of adopting this estima-
tion approach is that one does not allow for the possibility that the unobserved
productivity could be correlated with past choices of inputs.
2.4 Data
We extract data from Statistics Netherlands for the years 1989-2008. As an out-
put measure, we use the deflated value of gross output Yit (≡
QitPit
P jt
) of each firm i
in sector j in period t. Labor (Lit) refers to the number of employees in each firm
for each year,8 collected in September of that year. The corresponding wagesWit
include gross wages plus salaries and social contributions before taxes. The costs
of intermediate inputs (ZitMit) include costs of energy, intermediate materials,
and services. The unit user costs Rit (of capital stock Kit) are calculated as the
sum of the depreciation of fixed assets and the interest charges.
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
variable mean sd median p25 p75 N
Yit 26531.561 1.36e+05 6360.172 2895.117 16657.439 60672
Lit 112.162 303.621 50 28 105 ”
Mit 18100.772 98131.263 3885.728 1572.234 10905.304 ”
Kit 1671.484 16171.453 247.561 95.557 722.472 ”
siLt 0.270 0.127 0.179 0.258 0.345 ”
siMt 0.615 0.147 0.520 0.620 0.716 ”
siKt 0.045 0.044 0.019 0.035 0.058 ”
Qjt 0.940 0.153 0.853 0.966 1.039 ”
Note: p25 and p75 are, respectively, the 25th and the 75th percentile.
8For each enterprise, jobs are added and adjusted for part-time and duration factors, re-
sulting in number of men/years expressed as Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)(Source: Statistics
Netherlands)
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The nominal gross output and intermediate inputs are deflated with the appro-
priate price indices from the input-output tables available at the NACE rev. 1
two-digits sector classification.9 For capital, we use a two-digit NACE deflator
of fixed tangible assets calculated by Statistics Netherlands.
The data extracted from the Production Survey (PS) constitutes an unbalanced
panel data of 6727 firms (with a minimum of 2001 firms in 2001 and a maximum
of 5607 enterprises in 2006 and 1997) with 65866 observations spanning over
20 years and over 21 industries. We exclude from the sample firms producing
for less than two consecutive years.10 Also, firms with missing data on one
of the variables used in the empirical analysis are omitted. We exclude firms
exhibiting inputs growth of more than 200 percent or less than -50 percent (3822
observations dropped). We also exclude firms with an output growth of more
than 300 percent or less than -90 percent (1372 observations). The resulting
sample consists of 60672 observations (6718 firms).
Throughout our sample period, the PS surveys included some changes in their
population designs resulting in an unbalanced panel. As a result, we cannot
distinguish whether the entry or exit rates of firms resulted from survey response
behavior or real economic structural behavior. The number of firms (N) for each
NACE rev. 1 industry is calculated by Statistics Netherlands. Table 2.9 reports
the sectors that were chosen with a corresponding NACE two-digit code and the
corresponding number of firms.
Table 2.1 reports the means, medians, standard deviations, and first and third
quartiles of the included data for our main variables. In particular, a summary of
the of deflated revenues and of the inputs (in thousands Euros), along with input
shares in revenue, is presented. The input shares are constructed by dividing
respectively the (undeflated) firm input cost by the firm undeflated revenues. As
9NACE Rev. 1 is a 2-digit activity classification which was drawn up in 1989. It is a
revision of the General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the European
Communities, known by the acronym NACE and originally published by Eurostat in 1970.
10The numbers of firms for each number of observation are: 700(2), 1806(3), 2556(4), 3400(5),
2760(6), 3073(7), 2256(8), 3222(9), 2730(10), 3168(11), 3396(12), 4134(13), 4032(14), 3810(15),
3856(16), 3995(17), 4806(18), 3515(19), 3520(20), where the number of observation per firm is
reported between brackets.
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one can see, the dispersion of the logarithms of deflated output and inputs is
considerably large.11
During 1989-2008, the capital input constitutes 4.5 percent of gross output on av-
erage. The mean share of labor is 27 percent, and intermediate inputs constitute
more than half of gross output (61.5 percent). Moreover, the relative dispersion
of all these variables is considerably large, especially for the share of capital. The
exit rate, non reported here, is quite small (2.7 percent) and 75 percent of the
firms have been active on the market for 3 to 10 years.
2.5 Empirical results for the complete sample
of Dutch firms
In this section we present results for the entire manufacturing industry over the
period 1989-2008, without looking at the potential heterogeneity in the struc-
tural parameters across firms and/or through time, using the random coefficients
framework. Section 5.1 explores the empirical results where the relevant param-
eters are allowed to differ among product segments.
Table 2.2 reports the estimated parameters of interest of the production function
for the whole manufacturing industry. The table is organized per estimation ap-
proach: fixed effects (Within), instrumental variables (IV), Wooldridge (2009)’s
estimations of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) model (Wool.–LP). As already
reported, we estimate the latter model parametrically, proxying the unknown
functions gt(·) and h(·) in equation (2.25) with polynomials of third order. The
independent variable siLtlit is calculated by taking for the labor production share
siLt the sector specific labor production share s
j
Lt, with j = ji. For each econo-
metric approach, we consider three model specifications: a (the production func-
tion featuring both labor and product market imperfect competition), b (product
market imperfect competition only), and c (no corrections for omitted price bias
and labor imperfect competition). The model specifications b and c are included
for comparison purposes only.
11Averages over time and standard deviations for each sector are reported in Table 2.9 in
Appendix C.
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With every estimation technique, the results confirm the hypothesis of simul-
taneous output and labor markets imperfections. Columns a report evidence of
markups larger than one, rent–sharing parameters and wage markups larger than
zero. In line with Bughin (1993, 1996), Dobbelaere (2004), Abraham et al. (2009),
and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011)), we find that excluding the rent sharing
parameter (columns b) leads to an underestimation of the product markup. The
omitted output price bias (arising from the use of deflated gross output instead
of output in volumes) is evident when comparing columns b and c. All inputs
elasticities are biased downwards when we do not implement the correction for
the omitted output price bias (as suggested by Klette and Griliches (1996) and
De Loecker (2011)). Indeed, given that inputs and output are positively corre-
lated and output and price are negatively correlated, we expect the correlation
between inputs and firm–level price differences to be negative. These downward
biases are significant for the labor and material coefficients, but not statistically
significant for the capital coefficient estimated using the control function ap-
proach (Wool.–LP). De Loecker (2011) also finds similar results. In general, the
variation of the estimates of the capital coefficient when introducing the demand
shifter is much smaller compared with the other input elasticities. Additionally,
omitting the price variable leads to the underestimation of the scale elasticity.
Our estimates of the production function are not always in line with those found
in this literature. De Loecker (2011), using data from the Belgian textile indus-
try, corrects for both simultaneity (using the Olley and Pakes (1996)’s procedure)
and omitted price bias estimates and finds the estimated output markup equal
to 1.45 against our 1.09. Indeed, comparing his results with our column b of the
Wooldridge’s one step efficient estimation of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we
find much smaller production function coefficients (also smaller standard errors)
and output markup. De Loecker (2011) finds the inputs elasticities of labor,
material, and capital equal to 0.307, 0.906, 0.150, respectively.12
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011), with a first–difference OLS estimation of a
production function featuring an efficient bargaining in the labor market, find
decreasing returns to scale (0.792) versus our slightly increasing scale elasticity
(1.031, column a of the within estimator). On the other hand the labor and
12The standard errors of nonlinear combination of the estimated coefficient are computed
using the Delta method.
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capital elasticities are of approximately the same small magnitude. Their out-
put markup is equal to 1.102, while with our data on the Dutch manufacturing
industry, we find this to be larger (1.201). The bargaining parameter found by
Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011) with the OLS estimator is much larger (0.552)
than what Dobbelaere (2004) and we find, with the Arellano and Bond (1991)
and IV estimators, respectively. Indeed, the bargaining elasticity is equal to
0.482 (within estimator), while with the IV estimator we find a bargaining power
of 0.244, which coincides with what Dobbelaere (2004) finds. Dobbelaere and
Mairesse (2011) also perform a Blundell and Bond (2000)’s estimation of the
production function. Under this estimation approach, Dobbelaere and Mairesse
(2011) still find a low estimate of capital elasticity and slightly decreasing returns
to scale (0.033 and 0.969, respectively). Column a of the IV estimation reports
capital and scale elasticities of 0.080 and 1.301, respectively. On the other hand,
the output markup and bargaining parameter are much larger than what we
find. The markup is equal to 1.383 against our 1.284; the estimated bargaining
parameter is 0.552, while we find this to be equal to 0.244. However, the results
of Dobbelaere (2004) for Belgian data are somewhat inconsistent with the results
of Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2011), who use French data. The union’s bargain-
ing power parameter, according to McDonald and Suen (1992) framework, is
positively dependent on the ratio between the trade union density13 and the un-
employment rate. As this ratio is, at the aggregate level, higher for Belgium
than for France (roughly, 6.2 and 0.9, respectively; source: OECD.Stat), one
would expect to find higher bargaining power in Belgium rather than in France.
On the other hand, the Netherlands report a trade union density/unemployment
rate ratio of approximately 4. We would then expect to find a somewhat smaller
bargaining coefficient, rather than the exact same magnitude (if not larger, as we
move to the control function approach estimates). We find consistent results with
the (weighted) average of the workers’ power parameters over sectors. Indeed,
except for the within estimator, we find bargaining elasticities ranging between
0.196 and 0.217.
Along with the bargaining parameter, we are able to provide, within the pro-
duction function framework, an estimate of the wage markup. We notice how
13Trade union density corresponds to the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade
union members, divided by the total number of wage and salary earners (OECD Labour Force
Statistics).
Chapter 2. Firm-level productivity 32
the wage markup estimate is upward biased, when using the within estimator
(63.6%). When adopting a GMM framework, the wage markup fluctuates be-
tween 21.9% (IV) and 23.7% (one step Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)). These re-
sults are comparable with Aidt and Tzannatos (2008)’s review of wage markups
in high–income economies, which are between 0 and 25%.
In addition to the parameters mentioned above, we also report the profit ratio
parameter, which can be expressed as the estimated product markup divided by
the estimated elasticity of scale, µ̂
θ̂
. A profit ratio parameter larger than one
could be due to either imperfect competition or to decreasing returns to scale.
2.6 Across-Industry Estimates
The nature of the underestimation discussed in section 2.3 could be structural or
computational. If structural, i.e., the workers tend to gain higher wage rents in
those sectors where there is less competition, we expect to find a positive asso-
ciation between the wage markup µWj and the output markup µj (see equation
4.4). On the other hand, if the existing monopoly rents are eroded by some
bargaining power of workers’ union, the bias derives from an underestimation of
the true level of price–cost margins (Bughin, 1993, see) and we expect a negative
correlation between the two parameters.
Given the evidence of sectoral specificity of capital and labor14 (Dosi, 1999;
Ramey and Shapiro, 2001), we investigate the heterogeneity of the manufac-
turing industry, by studying across-industry firms’ production behavior.
For each of the 21 industries, we estimate equation (2.13) with and without the
extension to labor imperfections (model specifications a and b, respectively). Year
dummies are always included. Moreover, the production index is constructed as
in De Loecker (2011), by proxying the total demand for a 6-digit sector j̃ with
a (market share) weighted average of deflated revenue, qj̃t =
∑Nj̃
i msityit. Table
14The “social embeddedness” of firms’ routines and strategies is likely to be driven by socially
specific factors, such as the nature of the local labor markets, workforce training institutions,
financial institutions. Furthermore, Ramey and Shapiro (2001) suggest significant sectoral
specificity of physical capital and substantial costs of redeploying the capital.
Chapter 2. Firm-level productivity 33
2.4 reports the within estimates of the relevant parameters, namely the output
and wage markups, µ̂j and µ̂
Wj, respectively, and the bargaining elasticities, φ̂j.
Table 2.5 displays the IV estimated coefficients, while Tables 2.6 reports the
structural estimates obtained using the control function approach.
Testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity across sectors yields the conclusion that
all the structural parameters statistically differ from sector to sector, and are
sensitive to the estimation technique. This confirms the assumption of sectoral
specificities. Each sector has its own functioning, and the firm belonging to
a specific sector adopts a different production strategy compared to a firm in
another sector.
Quite consistently with what we found for the whole manufacturing industry,
excluding imperfections on the labor market leads to an underestimation of the
markups for the majority of sectors. When assuming imperfect competition on
the labor market and on the output market, the output market markups range
from 0.940 (sector 27, metals) to 2.730 (sector 25, rubber and plastic products)
for the within estimator; from 0.899 (sector 19, textile and leather products) to
3.380 (sector 20, wood) for the IV estimator; from 0.869 (sector 19) to 3.446 in the
manufacturing sector of wood (Wool.–LP estimator). On the other hand, when
disregarding the possibility to have frictions on the labor market, the output
price markups range from 0.857 (sector 27) to 1.439 (sector 25) for the within
estimator; from 0.921 (sector 19) to 1.632 (sector 23, coke, petroleum and nuclear
fuel) for the IV estimator; from 0.853 (sector 32) to 1.288 (sector 18) for the
Wool.–LP estimator.
With every estimation technique, we find negative correlation between the pa-
rameters µj and the labor market friction parameters µ
Wj and φj. The Spear-
man’s rank correlation coefficient becomes statistically significant as we perform
an IV, or Wool.–LP. This confirms the hypothesis of a pure computational bias of
the true level of the output markup µj, possibly caused by the misspecification of
the marginal costs, as we are omitting the direct effects of wage rigidities. There-
fore, firms share their monopoly rents with labor unions. This result is in contrast
with the findings of Crépon et al. (2002), Dobbelaere (2004), and Dobbelaere and
Mairesse (2011) who find positive correlation. Dobbelaere (2004) interprets this
positive correlation between labor bargaining and output market power as the
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effect of the exit of firms. In particular, she guesses that strong unions reduce
the firms’ share of rents, forcing some of the firms to exit the market, therefore
decreasing the degree of market power. Another explanation she provides deals
with the fact that stronger unions are attracted by those sectors where rents can
be extracted.
Both these two interpretations have problems. The first interpretation builds on
the premise of a static setting, which does not allow for the dynamic aspects of
competition (such as the implications of selection bias and reallocation effects).
The second interpretation concerns more the profitability of the firm, rather than
its level of price–cost margin. A more profitable firm can attract workers that are
able to extract some of the surplus. But a higher markup does not necessarily
mean that the enterprise is profitable, as it does not take into account relative
cost efficiencies (see Boone and van der Wiel (2007); Boone (2008); Griffith
et al. (2008) for a discussion on relative profits and relative cost efficiencies).
Therefore, we tested the correlation between the wage markup and the relative
profits measure (computed as in Boone and van der Wiel (2007)). We find
that indeed these two measures, profit elasticity and union power, are positively
correlated (ρ = 0.46, significant at the 5% level. Results of the profit elasticities
per sector are not reported, but available upon request.)
2.7 Impact on TFPG
In this paper we propose a measure of TFP growth (TFPG) derived from esti-
mating a production function which accounts for both imperfect competition on
the labor market and on the output market as derived in Section 2. The TFP
measure is computed as
TFPit = âit ≡ µ̂j
[







To compute the TFP growth index, we follow De Loecker and Konings (2006)
and take a employment based share weighted firm-level TFPG, where the shares
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We also derive a measure of TFPG following equation ((2.26)), allowing for the
structural parameters to vary across sectors. Table 2.3 reports the weighted
average TFPG percentage rates for every estimation approach and for all three
specifications (a, b, and c). We find that correcting for the omitted output prices,
therefore taking into account the possibility for the firms to set prices above their
marginal costs, leads to decreases of the TFPG percentage rates of 2.3% (within),
4.5% (IV), and 1.2% (Wool.-LP). Independently from the estimation technique
used, when assuming both bargaining on the labor market and imperfect compe-
tition on the output market, we find larger TFPG rates (column a). In particular,
with the within estimator we find a 47.6% higher TFPG rate than the TFPG
rate estimated under the sole assumption of imperfect competition on the prod-
uct market. With the IV, and the Wool.–LP, we find 158.2% and 122.8% higher
TFPG rates, respectively. Moreover, the size of the firm, measured as number of
employees, seems to be negatively correlated with the TFPG rates when using
the IV or control function approaches. In particular, we find that firms with less
than 50 employees are the most productive ones.
Figure 2.1 reports the three time series of the TFPG rates under the three dif-
ferent market structure assumptions (imperfect competition on both output and
labor markets, a, imperfect competition on the output market, b, and perfect
competition, c). Each panel reports the TFPG index under the three different
estimation strategies. The first striking feature of the estimates of the firms’
average productivity growth when assuming imperfect competition on both mar-
kets is its larger variance, with growth rates ranging from -3.96% to 9.95% (IV
estimation approach). Indeed, when considering the model specification b or c,
we find ranges of values between -1.09% and 3.07%, which are in line with the
TFPG rated reported by the OECD15 for the Dutch manufacturing sector. More-
over, with each estimation approach we find evidence of a positive time trend
only when we consider both labor and product market imperfections.
Table 2.7 reports the percentage growth rates estimated using IV and the Wool.-
LP approach for the functional assumptions a and b. We confront these two
estimation approaches as we want to investigate the consequences of allowing
the productivity to be distributed as an AR(1) process. As one can see, when
assuming wage premia and price markups (model a), omitting or including the
15 http://www.oecd.org/statistics/productivity.
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dynamics of the productivity process (IV or Wool.-LP) does not make a difference
in the TFPG rates, on average. On the other hand, when assuming only product
imperfect competition, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator yields much
lower growth rates. Looking at the first two columns of the table, we see that the
sectors that display very high TFPG rates (around 3%) wi are textile and leather
products, metal products, machinery and equipment, and transport equipment.
Sectors that have a TFPG rate between 2% and 3% are rubber and plastic
products, electrical and optical equipment, and transport equipment.16
Table 2.8 displays the Spearman’s correlation coefficients between TFPG rates
and the structural parameters describing the imperfect competition on the labor
and on the output market. When considering the possibility of a first-order
Markov productivity process, the weighted average productivity growth rate
seems to be positively associated with both labor market frictions parameters,
and with the output price mark-ups; while with the IV estimation of the TFPG,
we find a negative correlation between productivity growth, output, and labor
input price mark-ups.
Figure 2.2 plots the TFPG rates obtained from the two estimation approaches
(IV and Wool.-LP) against the workers bargaining parameter φj for each sector.
It is easy to detect the positive correlation between the productivity growth and
the bargaining parameter in the second plot. The economic benefits of unions
could be found in the worker–manager cooperation. Indeed, unions can increase
firms’ productivity by “shocking” the management into better production prac-
tices (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2008). Masayuki and Morikawa (2010) empirically
analyze the relationship between labor union and firm performance by using data
on 4000 Japanese firms in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector.
The presence of labor unions has statistically and economically significant posi-
tive effects on firm productivity. Indeed unions may enhance productivity when
these contribute to the strengthening of the firm’s competitiveness, by fostering
cooperation between labor and management.
16For the corresponding NACE codes of the sectors, see Table 2.9.
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2.8 Conclusion
This paper explores some of the econometric issues regarding the empirical anal-
ysis of a Cobb-Douglas production function in an imperfect competitive setting.
We consider to what extent the estimated unobserved firm–level productivity
growth (TFPG) is sensitive to different model assumptions and to different econo-
metric approaches.
Using firm–level data on 21 Dutch manufacturing sectors for the period 1989-
2005, we investigate the possibility of having a manufacturing industry featuring
both labor and output market distortions. In particular, we address the poten-
tial endogeneity issues concerning the simultaneity, the omitted output price,
and the collinearity among input factors of production. We find that, omitting
the evidence of workers’ wage bargaining power, leads to a significant underesti-
mation of the product markup (up to 16%). Omitting the potential correlation
between input choices and firm-level price deviations yields downward biased
input elasticities.
Moreover, we review different estimation techniques, and we propose an iden-
tification strategy that relies on the presence of imperfect competition in the
flexible input market, namely, the labor input market. In particular, we compare
three different estimation approaches that identify the structural parameters of
the revenue production function, namely, the fixed-effect estimator, the control
function approach, and the IV approach. With every estimation technique, our
results confirm the hypothesis of simultaneous output and labor markets imper-
fections. Output price markups are estimated between 1.201 (within) and 1.284
(IV). When using the within estimator, both the wage markup and the bargain-
ing elasticity estimates are upward biased (63.6% and 48.2%, respectively); while
when adopting a GMM framework, the wage markup fluctuates between 21.9%
(IV) and 23.7% (one step Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)).
When testing the hypothesis of heterogeneity across sectors, we find, consistently
with what we found for the whole manufacturing industry, that excluding im-
perfections on the labor market leads to an underestimation of the markups for
the majority of sectors. Moreover, we find negative correlation between the out-
put price markup parameters and the labor market friction parameters, across
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the sectors. This confirms our hypothesis of a pure computational bias of the
true level of the output markup, possibly caused by the misspecification of the
marginal costs, as we are omitting the direct effects of wage rigidities. Therefore,
firms share their monopoly rents with labor unions.
Additionally, we consider to what extent the estimated unobserved productivity
is sensitive to the different model specifications and to the different approaches
to identify the structural parameters of the model. We find that, when assuming
wage and price markups, considering or not the dynamics of the productivity
process (IV or Wool.-LP) does not make a difference in the TFPG rates, on
average. On the other hand, when assuming only product imperfect competi-
tion, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator yields much lower growth rates.
With the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimator the weighted average productiv-
ity growth rate seems to be positively associated with both labor market frictions
parameters, and with the output price mark-ups; while with the IV estimation of
the TFPG, we find a negative correlation between productivity growth, output
and labor input price mark-ups. Both estimators, however, yield a significant
and positive relation between productivity growth and the bargaining parame-
ter. Therefore, the presence of labor unions has statistically and economically
significantly positive effects on firm productivity. Indeed unions may enhance
productivity when these contribute to the strengthening of the firm’s competi-
tiveness, by fostering cooperation between labor and management.
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2.9 Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table 2.2: Results for the whole manufacturing industry
Within IV Wool.–LP
a b c a b c a b c
θ̂L
0.118 0.240 0.216 0.271 0.237 0.213 0.258 0.225 0.201
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.007 0.006
θ̂M
0.864 0.760 0.680 0.951 0.811 0.732 0.912 0.781 0.716
0.006 0.005 0.001 0.024 0.012 0.004 0.021 0.011 0.004
θ̂K
0.048 0.036 0.032 0.080 0.068 0.061 0.062 0.056 0.051
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
θ̂
1.031 1.036 0.929 1.301 1.116 1.006 1.233 1.061 0.973
0.008 0.007 0.002 0.034 0.016 0.002 0.030 0.021 0.005
µ̂
1.201 1.120 – 1.284 1.109 – 1.258 1.091 –
0.008 0.007 0.033 0.016 0.029 0.014
µ̂
θ̂
1.165 1.081 – 0.986 0.994 – 1.020 1.028 –
µ̂W
0.636 – – 0.219 – – 0.237 – –
0.006 0.022 0.020
φ̂
0.482 – – 0.244 – – 0.191 – –
0.001 0.001 0.024
Note: Sample period 1989-2008; dependent variable: log. gross deflated output yit.
The estimated structural parameters are retrieved as the following: θ̂L: sample mean of
µ̂(1 − µ̂W )sjLt, θ̂M = µ̂γ̂M , θ̂K = µ̂γ̂K , θ̂ = θ̂L + θ̂M + θ̂K , µ̂ = 1/(1 +
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t + ãit + ˜̃uit.
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Table 2.3: Weighted average TFP growth rates for the entire manufacturing sector (1989–2008)
a b c
Within
L ≤ 50 1.71 1.48 1.37
L ≤ 250 1.34 0.83 0.90
L > 250 1.52 1.13 1.11
avg 1.27 0.86 0.88
IV
L ≤ 50 2.13 1.08 1.00
L ≤ 250 1.41 0.35 0.46
L > 250 1.39 0.30 0.40
avg 1.73 0.67 0.70
Wool.− LP
L ≤ 50 2.19 1.18 1.12
L ≤ 250 1.57 0.54 0.62
L > 250 1.57 0.51 0.58
avg 1.85 0.83 0.84
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Table 2.4: Within estimates of µj, µ
W
it and φit for 21 industries
a b
Sector j µ̂j µ̂
Wj φ̂j µ̂j N.obs
j = 15 1.141 (0.034) 0.515 (0.017) 0.381 (0.002) 1.173 (0.034) 7750
17 1.224 (0.063) 0.374 (0.043) 0.439 (0.004) 1.161 (0.053) 1581
18 1.235 (0.108) 0.592 (0.065) 0.611 (0.009) 1.297 (0.113) 396
19 1.065 (0.116) 0.911 (0.079) 0.692 (0.015) 1.084 (0.118) 347
20 1.665 (0.104) 0.647 (0.027) 0.645 (0.004) 1.292 (0.052) 1969
21 1.077 (0.042) 0.426 (0.027) 0.425 (0.003) 0.898 (0.027) 2500
22 1.253 (0.040) 0.504 (0.018) 0.442 (0.002) 1.085 (0.028) 6255
23 1.322 (0.376) 0.679 (0.176) 0.271 (0.002) 1.275 (0.352) 193
24 1.045 (0.036) 0.363 (0.030) 0.266 (0.002) 1.086 (0.038) 3885
25 2.730 (0.562) 0.436 (0.029) 0.456 (0.003) 1.439 (0.149) 3202
26 1.112 (0.068) 0.787 (0.027) 0.530 (0.005) 1.098 (0.064) 2704
27 0.940 (0.045) 0.883 (0.028) 0.578 (0.005) 0.857 (0.033) 1240
28 2.553 (0.248) 0.582 (0.016) 0.559 (0.002) 1.276 (0.054) 9885
29 1.241 (0.031) 0.602 (0.015) 0.600 (0.002) 1.036 (0.019) 8554
30 1.124 (0.092) 0.890 (0.077) 0.742 (0.002) 1.067 (0.079) 180
31 1.074 (0.029) 0.568 (0.034) 0.492 (0.005) 0.999 (0.024) 1808
32 1.122 (0.093) 0.437 (0.094) 0.609 (0.009) 0.998 (0.061) 398
33 1.055 (0.025) 0.511 (0.025) 0.522 (0.003) 0.993 (0.021) 2062
34 1.006 (0.031) 0.565 (0.040) 0.454 (0.005) 0.973 (0.027) 1574
35 1.091 (0.048) 0.788 (0.035) 0.664 (0.006) 1.019 (0.039) 1523
36 1.170 (0.021) 0.439 (0.030) 0.499 (0.003) 1.063 (0.016) 2666
avg 1.297 0.593 0.518 1.103
ρµ̂j ,µ̂Wj = −0.188 ρµ̂j ,φ̂j = −0.014 ρφ̂j ,µ̂Wj = 0.694
∗∗∗
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Table 2.5: IV estimates of µ, µWit and φit for 21 industries
a b
Sector j µ̂j µ̂
Wj φ̂j µ̂j N.obs
j = 15 1.511 (0.139) 0.208 (0.051) 0.129 (0.001) 1.496 (0.142) 7750
17 1.116 (0.090) 0.082 (0.104) 0.133 (0.004) 1.189 (0.120) 1581
18 1.146 (0.131) 0.457 (0.143) 0.698 (0.029) 1.373 (0.265) 396
19 0.899 (0.098) 0.034 (0.084) 0.073 (0.009) 0.921 (0.098) 347
20 3.380 (0.862) 0.114 (0.061) 0.195 (0.004) 1.272 (0.070) 1969
21 1.159 (0.131) 0.056 (0.094) 0.085 (0.002) 1.045 (0.087) 2500
22 1.197 (0.083) 0.064 (0.057) 0.066 (0.001) 1.053 (0.053) 6255
23 1.096 (0.090) 0.452 (0.150) 0.160 (0.008) 1.632 (0.465) 193
24 1.114 (0.095) 0.347 (0.079) 0.225 (0.003) 1.230 (0.116) 3885
25 1.169 (0.140) 0.246 (0.136) 0.343 (0.004) 1.396 (0.318) 3202
26 0.974 (0.116) 0.230 (0.078) 0.247 (0.003) 1.042 (0.117) 2704
27 0.968 (0.083) 0.546 (0.099) 0.439 (0.004) 0.956 (0.064) 1240
28 1.408 (0.115) 0.149 (0.047) 0.215 (0.002) 0.962 (0.048) 9885
29 1.483 (0.097) 0.094 (0.040) 0.076 (0.001) 1.131 (0.041) 8554
30 1.108 (0.144) 0.095 (0.223) 0.311 (0.019) 0.940 (0.108) 180
31 1.271 (0.104) 0.070 (0.132) 0.103 (0.005) 1.078 (0.061) 1808
32 1.093 (0.159) 0.356 (0.131) 0.859 (0.064) 0.963 (0.127) 398
33 1.030 (0.051) 0.088 (0.067) 0.240 (0.008) 0.958 (0.038) 2062
34 0.953 (0.033) 0.142 (0.101) 0.097 (0.001) 1.026 (0.037) 1574
35 1.066 (0.092) 0.102 (0.099) 0.253 (0.010) 0.987 (0.059) 1523
36 1.179 (0.037) 0.139 (0.100) 0.160 (0.002) 1.027 (0.024) 2666
avg 1.253 0.194 0.243 1.128
ρµ̂j ,µ̂Wj = −0.173
∗∗∗ ρµ̂j ,φ̂j = −0.054
∗∗∗ ρφ̂j,µ̂Wj = 0.726
∗∗∗
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Table 2.6: Wool.–LP estimates of µ, µWit and φit for 21 industries
a b
Sector j µ̂j µ̂
Wj φ̂j µ̂j N.obs
j = 15 1.203 (0.069) 0.228 (0.043) 0.139 (0.001) 1.173 (0.064) 7750
17 1.030 (0.070) 0.124 (0.087) 0.189 (0.006) 1.027 (0.068) 1581
18 1.236 (0.166) 0.457 (0.143) 0.698 (0.029) 1.288 (0.172) 396
19 0.869 (0.085) 0.006 (0.103) 0.013 (0.002) 0.917 (0.082) 347
20 3.446 (0.843) 0.105 (0.060) 0.183 (0.004) 1.218 (0.063) 1969
21 1.015 (0.082) 0.074 (0.068) 0.109 (0.003) 0.986 (0.078) 2500
22 1.209 (0.081) 0.154 (0.052) 0.146 (0.002) 1.068 (0.060) 6255
23 0.952 (0.054) 0.288 (0.199) 0.109 (0.006) – – 193
24 1.056 (0.092) 0.373 (0.075) 0.238 (0.003) 1.095 (0.098) 3885
25 1.255 (0.177) 0.235 (0.120) 0.333 (0.004) 1.066 (0.123) 3202
26 0.954 (0.106) 0.253 (0.086) 0.265 (0.003) 0.974 (0.110) 2704
27 0.901 (0.065) 0.406 (0.123) 0.368 (0.004) 0.885 (0.057) 1240
28 1.445 (0.111) 0.146 (0.041) 0.211 (0.002) 0.979 (0.044) 9885
29 1.362 (0.075) 0.087 (0.041) 0.071 (0.001) 1.098 (0.040) 8554
30 1.263 (0.113) 0.025 (0.194) 0.105 (0.008) 0.996 (0.050) 180
31 1.267 (0.095) 0.149 (0.096) 0.197 (0.008) 1.065 (0.061) 1808
32 0.972 (0.143) 0.363 (0.125) 0.862 (0.063) 0.853 (0.105) 398
33 1.077 (0.056) 0.100 (0.077) 0.264 (0.009) 1.000 (0.046) 2062
34 0.938 (0.030) 0.000 (0.115) 0.000 (0.000) 0.972 (0.029) 1574
35 1.046 (0.079) 0.120 (0.092) 0.286 (0.010) 0.934 (0.055) 1523
36 1.105 (0.032) 0.042 (0.091) 0.054 (0.001) 0.994 (0.024) 2666
avg 1.219 0.178 0.230 1.029
ρµ̂j ,µ̂Wj = −0.199
∗∗∗ ρµ̂j ,φ̂j = −0.289
∗∗∗ ρφ̂j,µ̂Wj = 0.782
∗∗∗









t + ãit + ˜̃uit.
Standard errors in parentheses; sample period 1989-2008.
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Table 2.7: Weighted average TFP growth rates per sector
TFPG(a) TFPG(b)
sector IV Wool.-LP IV Wool.-LP
15 0.49 1.00 -0.44 0.13
17 1.09 0.81 1.11 0.80
18 2.62 3.35 2.88 2.55
19 3.16 2.23 1.27 1.02
20 1.64 1.47 -0.69 -0.85
21 0.69 0.87 0.39 0.53
22 0.34 0.37 0.16 0.21
23 – – – –
24 0.98 1.26 0.47 0.90
25 1.99 2.15 1.76 1.29
26 0.79 0.89 0.49 0.59
27 1.39 1.92 0.80 1.03
28 2.84 2.74 1.06 1.07
29 3.24 2.91 1.00 0.91
30 3.82 5.75 1.08 1.44
31 3.13 3.34 1.72 1.62
32 2.05 3.64 2.48 3.02
33 2.70 2.70 1.05 1.05
34 2.45 2.28 1.14 1.33
35 3.83 3.40 1.43 1.29
36 1.12 0.80 0.32 0.15
avg 1.90 1.91 1.28 0.73
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Figure 2.1: TFP Growth by estimation approach
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Figure 2.2: TFP Growth per sector

















































































Table 2.9: Averages per NACE 2-digit sector code
Sector yit lit mit kit siLt siMt siKt Q
J
t N.obs.(N.firms)
15 9.311 4.185 8.904 6.089 0.200 0.688 0.055 0.991 7750(884)
17 8.817 4.037 8.254 5.562 0.273 0.618 0.043 1.047 1581(160)
18 7.931 3.464 7.325 4.150 0.294 0.596 0.029 1.297 396(56)
19 7.387 2.914 6.803 3.885 0.256 0.596 0.034 0.955 347(62)
20 8.609 3.890 8.204 5.157 0.264 0.651 0.033 0.911 1969(219)
21 9.468 4.437 9.002 6.562 0.241 0.633 0.058 0.929 2500(203)
22 8.522 3.821 7.921 5.457 0.312 0.560 0.056 1.032 6255(774)
23 10.264 4.566 9.820 7.598 0.129 0.735 0.060 1.059 193(23)
24 9.741 4.362 9.214 6.630 0.192 0.669 0.052 1.004 3885(419)
25 9.166 4.217 8.654 6.123 0.245 0.631 0.055 0.907 3202(321)
26 8.974 3.989 8.401 5.955 0.247 0.599 0.057 0.947 2704(275)
27 9.284 4.310 8.764 6.069 0.244 0.643 0.046 0.947 1240(125)
28 8.548 3.886 7.974 5.113 0.300 0.588 0.041 0.886 9885(1116)
29 8.853 4.110 8.306 5.283 0.303 0.595 0.033 0.881 8554(907)
30 9.396 4.428 8.895 5.375 0.286 0.634 0.034 1.128 180(23)
31 8.729 3.939 8.141 5.030 0.289 0.597 0.031 1.045 1808(211)
32 8.451 3.758 7.811 4.991 0.301 0.583 0.050 1.013 398(74)
33 8.454 3.905 7.692 4.874 0.356 0.514 0.037 1.040 2062(269)
34 9.009 4.174 8.576 5.240 0.248 0.670 0.029 0.932 1574(163)
35 8.889 4.013 8.395 4.900 0.270 0.643 0.026 0.922 1523(187)
36 8.476 3.918 7.931 5.003 0.301 0.603 0.035 0.944 2666(305)
Total 8.892 4.046 8.358 5.555 0.270 0.615 0.044 0.953 60672(6727)
Note: Averages per sector through the sample period 1989-2005. NACE two-digit codes: food products, beverages and tobacco (15-16);
textile and leather products (17-19); wood (20); paper, paper products, publishing and printing (21-22); coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel (23); chemicals and chemical products (24); rubber and plastic products (25); other non-metallic mineral products (26);
basis metals and fabricated metal products (27-28); machinery and equipment n.e.c. (29); electrical and optical equipment (30-33); transport
equipment (34-35); other manufacturing activities (36).

Chapter 3
Multilevel Heterogeneity of R&D
Cooperation Determinants
Abstract. Using data from the 2006 edition of the Community Innovation Sur-
vey (CIS) for the Netherlands, we propose a methodology to study the effect of
firm-level characteristics on the propensity to undertake a research collaborative
agreement. In particular, we show that controlling for a richer variance structure,
that describes the expected correlation present among firms within a particular
sector, leads to the correct innovation policy impact evaluation. The suggested
multilevel design, with firms nested in sectors, proves to be the gauge of the
effectiveness of public innovation policies. Moreover, such a hierarchical frame-
work can be generalized allowing for clustering at higher levels, such as sectors
or geographical areas. In line with the literature on R&D cooperation deter-
minants, our results confirm the importance of technological spillovers, risk and
cost sharing rationales, firm’s size, and type of innovative activity in influencing
the decision to engage in different sorts of research alliances. Moreover, we find
that, in addition to the firm-level heterogeneity in cooperation strategies, there
is correlation between firms within each sector. In fact, enterprises within the
same industry could face similar market conditions, such as the level of compe-
tition. Therefore, R&D cooperation decisions, as well as innovative production,
are firm-level processes, where a strong sectoral specificity exists.
49
Chapter 3. Multilevel heterogeneity of the R&D cooperation determinants 50
3.1 Introduction
Given the increasing market pressures, a firm that wants to survive must not
only be innovative, but also ready to face shorter business cycles,17 and prompt
to meet a more dynamic demand. Phenomena such as knowledge outsourcing
and networking are at the core of entrepreneurial actions. In particular, firms
decide to collaborate in research for various economic reasons. In fact, a research
alliance could aim at strengthening the member firms’ core competencies, so as to
reach for new markets, or it may be a strategic decision to access complementary
knowledge in order to compensate for the absence of internal competencies or to
reduce the costs associated with knowledge spillovers. The theoretical literature
on cooperative R&D points at the internalization of the technological spillovers
as the main rationale behind the decision to cooperate (Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992). Parallel to the theory, the empiri-
cal literature confirms the relevance of such spillovers in influencing the choice
of cooperating, and extends the analysis on R&D cooperation determinants by
distinguishing between incoming and outgoing spillovers (Cassiman and Veugel-
ers, 2002, 2006; Lopez, 2008). Moreover, several authors focus on the analysis
of the heterogeneity in the determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to engage
in R&D cooperation (Kaiser, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004b,a). These studies
explore the differences in the factors affecting the firms’ probability to establish
different types of cooperation, namely horizontal cooperation (with competitors),
vertical cooperation (with suppliers or customers), and institutional cooperation
(with universities and research institutes). Furthermore, Belderbos et al. (2004a)
relax the assumption on the independence among different cooperation strate-
gies, accounting for possible correlations between the strategies that could be
due to technological complementarities. However, the existing literature on the
determinants of R&D cooperation with different R&D partners overlooks the role
of sectoral specificities (for example, sector-specific physical assets) in influenc-
ing the expected correlation among the different cooperative strategies present
17Recent research employing spectral analysis has confirmed the presence of sinusoidal-like
cycles (called Kondratiev) in the world GDP dynamics at an acceptable level of statistical
significance. Korotayev and Tsirel (2010) detected shorter (on average 17 years) business
cycles, approximately one third of the Kondratiev cycles.
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among firms within a particular sector.18 As a matter of fact, horizontal R&D
cooperations are likely to be formed within the same sector as it will lead to
collective efficiencies (Schmitz, 1999) in the form of reduced transaction costs
and accelerated innovation rates through a greater market access. These col-
lective efficiencies are of particular interest from a policy perspective. In fact,
they can be interpreted as the multiplier effect of an innovation policy: the in-
creased innovative intensity of one company or several companies multiplies the
economic benefits in a given sector by helping to drive the innovative intensity of
other business entities. This type of externality is demand-driven, in the sense
that the private and public for innovation can be stimulated by new or growing
business enterprises, which enables their suppliers to grow as well.
Such collective interactive processes may derive from organizational proximities,
and when organizational proximity arises between organizations connected by
a relationship of either economic or financial dependence/interdependence, Ki-
rat and Lung (1999) state that intra-sectoral links are liable to dominate inter-
sectoral links.
Therefore, in this paper, we control for a richer variance structure that describes
the expected correlation present among firms’ cooperative choices within a par-
ticular sector. In particular, we analyze the correlation among different R&D
alliances due to both firm- and sector-level heterogeneity, adopting a multivari-
ate hierarchical logit model. The advantages of adopting a hierarchical structure
(often referred to as multilevel, random or mixed, (see Goldstein, 1995; Hedeker
and Gibbons, 1996)) are several. First, it allows us to assume and specify a more
complex covariance structure. This means that we can fit a regression model to
firm-level data, while accounting for unexplained variation among the sectors,
aiming at capturing relevant features to explain the propensities to undertake
a specific cooperative agreement. Second, there is no need to have a balanced
design or equally spaced measurements, as the number of firms per sector is al-
lowed to vary. Third, unlike the multivariate probit, the logit specification is not
restricted to the normal distribution assumption for the individual effects, and
18Depending on the model assumptions, and compatibly with the data at hand, one could
allow for a richer specification of the clusters, such as the geographical district, or the relevant
markets. We limit ourselves to a frugal, yet general representation of a multilevel design in the
context of research cooperation determinants.
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its statistical fit is more accessible because of the odds-ratio interpretation of the
logit coefficients. Its derivation is straightforward, and simulation of its choice
probabilities is computationally simple.
Our approach departs from the one used to test for complementarities (Mohnen
and Roller, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2006), as our main focus is not to estimate the
degree of strategic complementarities or substitutabilities among firms’ cooper-
ation choices, but rather to model and estimate both individual and aggregate
forms of externalities, in which the collective actions of a reference group affect
an individual’s choices. As pointed out by Mohnen and Roller (2005), innovation
policies may have different impacts on the distinctive phases of the innovation
process. As a matter of fact, while there could be firm-level policy externalities
in the decision to collaborate in research, the innovative produce might well be
affected by the aforementioned demand driven innovation policy externality.
Therefore, to explicitly take into account both firm- and sector-level externalities,
and the different impact of innovation policy measures on the two phases of
the innovative process, we divide our study in two stage. In the first stage we
study the main drivers of undertaking a collaborative agreement with a research
partner. In the second stage, we investigate the effects of innovation policies and
R&D cooperation on innovative intensity.
Using data from the 2006 edition of the Community Innovation Survey (CIS2006)
on 1,947 innovating Dutch firms operating in 15 manufacturing sectors, we an-
alyze the firm- and sector-level heterogeneity of the determinants of R&D co-
operations and of the production of innovative output determinants. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to model the firms’ determinants of
R&D partner’s choices and to assess the impact of public financial support to
innovative output through a hierarchical model.
Our results confirm the hypothesis of a more structured correlation assumption.
As a matter of fact, additional to the well documented firm-level heterogeneity
(Belderbos et al., 2004a), we find evidence of sector-level heterogeneity in the
variables explaining the probabilities to cooperate and in the factors affecting
the level of innovative production. Moreover, controlling for public financial
support for innovation activities at different levels of government, we show that
when using the suggested multilevel approach the impact of public funding has
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a positive and significant sign, while, when omitting this nested framework, the
policies have a poor effect on innovative turnover.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we look at
the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the R&D cooperation deter-
minants to guide our own empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the model. In
Section 4, we describe the data. Section 5 and 6 discuss the empirical results
of the mixed models to describe both the propensity to undertake the different
cooperation agreements, and the impact of the public funding on the firm-level
innovative output. Section 7 summarizes.
3.2 Determinants of R&D cooperation: a re-
view of firm-level and industry-level factors
The Industrial Organization (IO) literature has pointed to technological spillovers
as one of the important factors influencing the firms’ incentives to engage in
cooperative R&D (Katz, 1986; d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al.,
1992). R&D spillovers arise when new knowledge created by one firm is also
beneficial to other firms. Theoretical studies suggest that a high level of R&D
spillovers can increase the firms’ probability of internalizing the spillovers by
participating in R&D cooperation.
The relationship between spillovers and R&D cooperation has also been analyzed
using empirical studies. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) empirically explore the
effects of knowledge flows on R&D cooperation on Belgian firms’ decisions to en-
ter into a cooperative R&D agreement, highlighting the distinction between the
effect of knowledge flows into firms (incoming spillovers) and that of outbound
knowledge flows (appropriability). Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) observe a
significant relation between external information flows and the decision to coop-
erate in R&D. Indeed, the most important finding of their two-step probit model
is that the probability of firms cooperating in R&D is higher when incoming
spillovers are high and outgoing spillovers are low. Furthermore, cost-sharing is
found to be an important motive for cooperation in R&D, while risk-sharing is
not. The empirical model of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) has been to some
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extent modified and applied to Spanish firms by Lopez (2008), who focuses on
the role of cost and risk sharing of innovation projects for the cooperation de-
cision, and finds evidence supporting the importance of cost/risk sharing as a
hampering factor for the innovation process. Further, the paper of Lopez (2008)
pays much attention to the endogeneity of the independent variables which in
other papers are assumed to be endogenous a priori. The results confirm the
conclusions of Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) that spillovers and appropriability
play an important part in influencing R&D cooperation decisions, only when an
adequate structure of endogeneity is chosen. Indeed, the hypothesis of exogene-
ity of incoming spillovers and appropriability is rejected, while the exogeneity of
R&D intensity cannot be rejected.
In a study based on data of European firms, Hernán et al. (2003) follow a two-
step procedure. In the first stage, the entire population that could potentially
participate in a cooperative organization is considered. In this first stage, it is
possible to measure the effect of the relevant firm characteristics that influence
a Research Joint Venture (RJV) formation. In the second stage, the focus is on
firms that are known to have a higher probability to participate in cooperative
R&D projects. Using a large database of firms from almost twenty European
countries, Hernán et al. (2003) find that, contrary to what has been found by
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) and more in line with the aforementioned IO
theory, patents’ effectiveness and, therefore, the level of appropriability, reduces
R&D cooperations. Moreover, among individual firm characteristics, firm size,
and previous participation experience increase the likelihood of participating.
Industry-level characteristics are also significant, especially R&D intensity. RJVs
are also more likely in more concentrated industries where technological knowl-
edge diffuses rapidly. Therefore, a minimum level of industry concentration is
needed for RJVs to be formed. One possible explanation for the significance
of firm size is that EU programs favor large partnerships, which may be more
costly to manage. An important characteristic of their analysis is that they use
a large control group that is representative for the whole population of European
firms. With respect to differences between countries, Hernán et al. (2003) find
that mainly firms in smaller countries participate in projects funded by the EU;
according to the authors this is because firms in large countries can find part-
ners in their own country more easily. Spillovers are measured at the industry
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level and are proxied by the average number of months before the diffusion of an
innovation in the industry and the effectiveness of patents in the industry, both
based on previous analyses. Problems of endogeneity are dealt with by lagging
all time-dependent right-hand-side variables by two years.
New and sharper results dealing with the relationship between R&D coopera-
tion, spillovers, and productivity appear in Belderbos et al. (2004a), who con-
struct a multivariate cross-sectional probit model to explore differences in the
determinants of innovating firms’ decisions to participate in four distinct types
of partner specific innovation strategies (cooperation with competitors, suppliers,
customers, and universities and research institutes). With a large Dutch dataset
(627 firms with R&D cooperation of some type), evidence of a positive impact
of R&D cooperation on labor productivity growth is found, but with distinct
differences depending on (the combination of) cooperation types. Competitor
and supplier cooperations seem to have the most positively significant impact
on productivity growth. The results for the other variables show that incom-
ing spillovers and R&D intensity are statistically significant in explaining R&D
cooperation with firms from the same industry.
Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) find that the formation of inter-firm alliances
is likely to vary among firms and can be due to a large number of reasons, such
as the nature and the scope of the R&D projects. In particular, the authors
show that if a firm’s aim in a cooperative agreement is to share complementary
technology, it will tend to cooperate with heterogeneous partners (heterogeneous
in knowledge assets, market scope, location, and product range), while, when
the motivation for cooperation is based on internalizing outgoing spillovers or on
increasing market power, symmetric partnerships (i.e., horizontal or vertical) are
more likely.
A less developed strand of literature deals with the innovativeness of firms and
their propensity to cooperate. As a matter of fact, some R&D alliances may
differ in the degree of technological effort required. Indeed, we can identify two
types of innovations that R&D partnerships may develop: radical and incremen-
tal.19 A radical innovation is a product, process, or service offering ”significant
19The labels radical and incremental belong mostly to the managerial literature (see Dewar
and Dutton (1986); Henderson (1993)).
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improvements in performance or cost that transform existing markets or create
new ones” (Leifer et al., 2001). On the other hand, incremental innovations are
based on minor changes or improvements in the current technology. Nonetheless,
similar concepts are implicitly used in the economic literature. IO theorists, as
for example Reinganum (1983), use terms such as drastic innovations to describe
those changes in technology that determine a decrease in costs such that the new
equilibrium price lies below the pre-innovation cost and consequently turn the
innovator into a monopolist. On the other hand, non-drastic or gradual inno-
vations only introduce costs asymmetries that do not transform the market into
a monopoly. Tether (2002) observed that true or radical innovators cooperate
more than those who introduce only imitative innovations.
None of these studies, however, controls for the likely multilevel structure of the
data. As a matter of fact, data may occur in clusters, such as sectors in which
firms are nested. One approach to modeling such type of data includes random
effects for subjects (firms) or clusters (sectors) into account. This provides a
mechanism of accounting for certain correlation structures among the clustered
observations.
3.3 Model specification
To investigate the relationship between the factors driving the propensity to
collaborate with different research partners, we assume a hierarchical structure
of the model specification. In particular, we adopt a multivariate mixed logit
model (multi-response Generalized Linear Mixed Model– GLMM, (Hedeker and
Gibbons, 1996)).20 Using the terminology of multilevel analysis, let i denote the
level-1 units (nested observations, i.e., firms) and let j denote the level-2 units
(subjects, i.e., sectors). Assume there are j = 1, . . . , J sectors and i = 1, . . . , N
firms. The total number of firms is given by N =
∑J
j=1 nj , where nj is the
number of firms nested within each sector (level-2 unit). Each firm i is faced
with c = 1, . . . , C different choices of cooperation strategies.
20The class of mixed logit models is a highly flexible as it can approximate any random
utility model (Train, 2009). The results we present can be generalized and extended to panel
data.
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Let us define the utility that firm i in sector j obtains from choosing cooperation
c as
















c are the intercept and the vector of category-specific fixed effects, re-
spectively, xij and zij are vectors of observed variables. The error term ǫ
c
ij is
assumed to be independently, identically extreme value distributed. The firm-
and sector-level random coefficients, γci and α
c
j ≡ (α1j , . . . , α
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qj)
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be normally distributed,
αcj ∼ Nq(0,W ) and γ
c
i ∼ N(0, r),
where q is the number of random effects included in the model. The variances
of the firm- and sector-level random components, r and W = diag(w1, . . . , wq),
respectively, are assumed to be invariant to cooperation choice c. We define the
random effects for all sectors as αc ≡ ((αc1)
′, . . . , (αcJ)
′)′, for all firms as γc ≡
(γc1, . . . , γ
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′, and for all c cooperation strategies as α ≡
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random intercepts and slopes, γ and α have the following covariance structure:
γ ∼ N(0,G1) and α ∼ N(0,G2).
G1 and G2 are defined as the Kronecker product between matrices A1, and A2,
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are the firm- and sector-level cooperation strategy-specific covariance matrices
with elements ςcc̃ = ςc̃c, and σcc̃ = σc̃c, for c 6= c̃. In our application, these are
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4× 4 matrices, as we consider 4 types of R&D cooperation (C = 4), and where
A1 = diag(r1, . . . , rN) and A2 = diag(W1, . . . ,WJ).
The matrices W1, . . . ,WJ have dimension q × q, so that the dimension of A2 is
qJ × qJ .21 G1 and G2 are block matrices of dimension 4N × 4N and 4qJ × 4qJ ,
respectively. The model specification can be generalized so as to take into ac-
count for both random coefficients and heteroskedasticity, by using the following
specification for the random intercept and coefficients:
αcj ∼ Nq(0,Wj) and γ
c
i ∼ N(0, ri).
The variances of the firm- and sector-level random components, ri and Wj =
diag(w1j, . . . , wqj), would then measure the degree of heterogeneity of each firm,
nested in each sector. In this paper, the only source of heteroskedasticity which
is explicitly taken into account is the one deriving from different cooperation
alternatives, ςcc̃ and σcc̃.
The regression parameters are collected in the vector θ = ((β0, (β
c)′, α′, γ′). Given
the extreme value distribution assumption of the error term ǫcij , the likelihood
for firm i in sector j of the binary decision to cooperate partner c (independently






1 + exp(V cij)
, (3.3)
where ycij ∈ {0, 1} is the observed research cooperation choice. Assuming con-
ditional independence of firm’s choice probabilities given the covariates and the
random effects, we can write the unconditional marginal probability22 of the






j , where dij is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if firm i is nested in sector j and zero otherwise, αcj is reduced to a category-specific
random intercept. In such a case Wj = wj and A2 = diag(w1, . . . , wJ ) would be a simple
diagonal matrix of dimension J × J .
22Coull and Agresti (2000) derive a multivariate Binomial logit-normal distribution, where
the c responses Yi = (Yi1, . . . , Yic) with index vector mi = (mi1, . . . ,mic) are assumed to
be independent binomial distributions, with success parameter vector πi. Then the multi-
variate Binomial logit-normal model is expressed by incorporating a random effect, such that
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The prior densities π1(γ|G1) and π2(α|G2) (also called mixing distributions) are
assumed to be independent (see the Appendix for a description of a Bayesian
Multivariate Mixed Logit Model).
In the next subsections, we describe the data, and how we construct the firm-
and sector-level characteristics influencing the choice among the different research
partners.
3.4 Data
The data used for the present study corresponds to the 2006 edition of the Com-
munity Innovation Survey23 (also referred to as CIS2006), carried out by Statis-
tics Netherlands.
The Dutch CIS2006 collected data on product and process innovation, as well
as organisational and marketing innovation during the three-year period 2004 to
2006. The total number of manufacturing firms participating to the survey was
1,929.
logit(πi) = Xiβ + zi. where Xi is a c × p covariate matrix and zi is a c × 1 vector of ran-
dom effects and is distributed as a multivariate normal distribution with mean vector 0 and




fB(y|π,m)fN (z; Σ)dz (3.4)
where fB(y|π,m) denotes the binomial probability mass function with m trials and success
probability π and fN (z; Σ) denotes the multivariate normal density function of z.
23The Community Innovation Surveys are designed to provide an extensive description of
the general structure of innovative activities at the country and industry levels. Within the
guidelines of the OSLO Manual on performing innovation surveys (OECD, 1997), information
about innovation activities is collected.
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3.4.1 Dependent Variables
The dependent variables of the model are dummy variables equal to one if the
firm, during the three years 2004 to 2006, actively participated with other en-
terprises or non-commercial institutions on innovation activities. In particular,
as in Belderbos et al. (2004a), we consider four R&D partnerships, namely with
suppliers, clients, competitors, or research institutes and/or universities (institu-
tional cooperation).
Cooperation networks can be further distinguished in two types of cooperative
behavior. The first is based on the synergies obtained by combining complemen-
tary assets. This combination of resources enables a more complete or intense use
of the different types of assets possessed by each firm. One of the most important
of these complementary cooperation agreements is the vertical or supply-chain
cooperation, in which the company cooperates with its customers and/or suppli-
ers (Tether, 2002).
The second rationale which characterizes the other type of cooperative agree-
ment consists in competitive positioning (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), i.e.,
seeking market power. This type of cooperation, also known as horizontal R&D
cooperation tends to form matches between competing firms that might have
similar needs in terms of product or process development, looking for resources
of the same type (technological, human, and so on). A summary of the per-
centages of firms adopting the four types of R&D cooperation is presented in
Table 3.1. Vertical cooperation, Covertij , is the most frequent type of agreement,
as 27% of firms decide to engage in either a collaboration with suppliers, Cosuppij
(25%), or with customers, Cocustij (19%). The last column of the table reports the
number of firms undertaking the various collaborations. R&D cooperation with
other competing enterprises is the least frequently observed choice (7% of the
total sample). Collaboration with universities and public institution of research
is chosen by 278 out of 1927 firms.
Table 3.2 reports percentages (and numbers) of firms undertaking at least one
cooperation alliance that maintain cooperative R&D agreements with the same
or different partners. It is interesting to note that, even though most of the R&D
cooperations are formed between the same type of partner (the percentages on
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Cooperation type % of coop. firms sd N.of firms
Coij 0.285 0.451 549
Cosuppij 0.250 0.433 481
Cocustij 0.186 0.389 359
Cocompij 0.075 0.263 144
Coinstij 0.144 0.351 278
Covertij 0.273 0.446 526
Note: Average percentages and number of firms engaging in different types of cooperation
agreements: suppliers, clients, competitors, or public research institutions. Vertical cooperation





Table 3.2: Cooperative R&D agreement combinations
Suppliers Customers Competitors Institutional
Suppliers 81.16(547) 53.26(359) 23.89(161) 50.15(338)
Clients or customers - 60.98(411) 20.77(140) 40.65(274)
Competitors - - 26.71(180) 21.07(142)
Institutional - - - 59.94(404)
Note: R&D partner choices composition of firms with at least one cooperative R&D agreement.
Absolute frequencies in parentheses.
the diagonal are larger than the off-diagonal ones), a large share of firms is ex-
changing knowledge with other sorts of collaborators. For example, 338 firms
which cooperate with suppliers have agreements also with research institutions,
while only 161 firms cooperating with suppliers maintain agreements with com-
petitors.
3.4.2 Independent Variables
Following the existing theoretical and empirical work, we propose four sets of ex-
planatory variables related to firms’ characteristics, obstacles to innovation that
the firm should overcome, the existence of public funding to encourage R&D, and
sectoral characteristics within which the firm operates. With regard to firms’
characteristics, firm-level knowledge inflows, also defined as incoming spillovers
(Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), are derived from the scores of importance of
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics
variable mean sd min max
Inij 0.572 – 0 1
radij 0.317 – 0 1
incij 0.336 – 0 1
spillij 0.161 0.255 0.000 1.000
sizeij 4.234 1.134 0.405 9.942
riskit 0.228 0.303 0.000 1.000
costij 0.259 0.333 0.000 1.000
funlocij 0.069 – 0 1
fungmtij 0.259 – 0 1
funeuij 0.049 – 0 1
lpij 0.270 – 0 1
HHIj 0.078 0.098 0.015 0.378
gpij 0.663 – 0 1
rdpiij 0.026 0.079 0.000 0.957
publicly available information. We denote the spillover variable by spillij . Un-
fortunately, the 2006 edition of the CIS does not collect any information on the
level of appropriability, namely, the degree of strategic protection the firms adopt
for their innovations. Table 3.3 reports summary statistics of the regressors used
to estimate the set of coefficients θ and the variances V1 and V2 of the mixed
logit model as in (3.5). The variable spillij measures the degree of importance of
publicly available source of information. The variable was originally coded from
0 (not used) to 3 (highly important), and we recoded in {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. Size
turns out to be another important determinant of R&D cooperation. Cassiman
and Veugelers (2006) highlighted how the size of the firms is a control variable,
traditionally used by the literature in firm-level analysis. Therefore, in line with
the existing literature, we include firm size measured as the logarithm of the
number of the firm’s employees (sizeij). On average the log of labor is 4.234.
The innovativeness of firms is proxied by two dummy variables. The first dummy
variable, radij, proxying radical innovation, takes the value one if the enterprise
introduced a new good or service into its market before its competitors, while the
second dummy, incij , is equal to 1 if a new good or service was already available
from the competitors in the market of interest (incremental innovation). Firms
introducing a radical innovations account for 32% of the sample, while imitative
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innovators sum up to 34% of the total number of firms in the sample. Among
determinants of R&D cooperation, firms’ absorptive capacity is considered as
one of the most important. To proxy firms’ absorptive capacity R&D personnel
intensity (rdpiij) is often used (Tether, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004b,a) instead
of R&D expenditure. R&D personnel intensity is defined here as the ratio be-
tween R&D personnel and size of firms. On average, only 3% of the labor force
is dedicated to research activities.
The variables riskij , and costij measure the degree of importance, {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1},
attributed by firms to the two factors hampering innovation activities. The cost
factor seems to be larger than the risk associated with market uncertainty (26%
versus 23%). The literature on R&D cooperation shows that the risks and costs
of innovation and the need to exploit complementary resources are the main mo-
tivations for cooperative behavior, and therefore, that cooperative behavior may
be positively related to a number of obstacles such as high risks and cost of inno-
vation. R&D cooperations, in fact, allow firms to share costs or to reduce risks
of innovation. In this regard, we hypothesize that a cooperation with customers
could reduce the risk to introduce a radical innovation in the market. With re-
gard to public funding, this in general has a positive influence on firms’ R&D
expenditure and, following Veugelers (1997), indirectly influences the propensity
to cooperate in R&D. We therefore include dummies taking value 1 if the firm
benefitted from both local, national, and European scientific and technological
policies (funlocij, fungmtij, and funeuij, respectively) sponsoring cooperative
projects, as they potentially constitute an incentive to cooperate. The number
of firms receiving a national funding account for 26% of the observations, while
local and European financial support is less frequent, as only 7 and 5 percent of
firms received public sector support, respectively.
The integration of the firm into a group may also have a positive influence on
cooperation as it indicates access to a substantial pool of resources, which are
complementary to R&D. Thus, we include the intra-group variable, gp, a control
variable which is equal to 1 when the firm belongs to a group, and 66% of the
firms are part of an enterprise group.
As for sectoral characteristics, we include the degree of industry concentration,
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHIij), as this may affect firms’
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motivation of combining resources with other firms. However, the impact of
market concentration on the firms’ propensity to form R&D alliances is a theme
empirically less explored. The empirical contribution of Hernán et al. (2003)
showed a positive impact of market concentration on the propensity of firms
to cooperate in R&D, since a more concentrated industry offers a greater op-
portunity for internalization of spillovers. Wang and Zajac (2007), instead, did
not achieve clear-cut conclusions since they found different results for different
model specifications. The estimated Herfindahl-Hirschman index is, on average,
8%. The index range from, 0.015, not concentrated, to 0.378, moderately/highly
concentrated sector.
3.5 Estimation Results
In the current section, we present the results of the multivariate mixed-effects
logistic regression model as in (3.5), showing how R&D collective interactions
are firm-level processes with high heterogeneity of actors and activities, where a
strong sectoral specificity exists. In particular, we distinguish between firm-level
and sectoral-level determinants of R&D cooperation. Table 3.4 reports results
for the complete sample of 1929 observations.
As it has been shown in previous literature, some (if not all) of the variables
included in this model may be endogenous. In this paper, we do not control for
omitted variables, selection, or simultaneity, therefore the estimates are causally
uninterpretable. The estimation approach we propose is rather aiming at the
decomposition of the conditional variance structure due to firm- and sector-level
heterogeneity. In fact, the expected correlation among the different firms’ co-
operative strategies is expected to have a nested structure that could pick the
multiplier effect of innovation policies.
With the potential lack of interpretation in mind, we note that the estimated co-
efficients statistically differ across the equations24, indicating the appropriateness
of distinguishing between cooperation types. We observed that the innovative-
ness of a firm plays an important role in disentangling the determinants of R&D
24We formally test differences in the estimated coefficients using a Welch two-sample t-test.
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cooperation. In particular, as expected, developing radical innovation, therefore
being a ‘true’ innovator, has a larger impact on all four cooperation types than
performing only imitative innovations. It is interesting to note that the enter-
prises which introduced a new good or service in their reference market before
their competitors, tend to form alliances with customers in the first place. As a
matter of fact, introducing a radical innovation increases the odds of cooperating
with customers by more than 2.5 times (i.e., it increases the probability to coop-
erate with customers by almost 72%). On the other hand, introducing a new (to
the firm) good already available from the competitors in the market in which the
firm operates, enhances the chance to establish a formal R&D agreement with a
competitor more than with other partners.
The hypothesis that incoming spillovers positively affect the probability of coop-
eration is confirmed only for two cooperation types. The spillover variable (spill),
measured as the total pool of external knowledge that is potentially available for
a firm, has a high and significantly positive impact only on competitors and in-
stitutional cooperation strategies (odd-ratios of 3.661 and 6.043, respectively).
Higher incoming spillovers positively affect the probability of cooperating with
research institutes and competitors, but have no effect on cooperation with cus-
tomers or suppliers. Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) also do not find evidence
of a significant impact of incoming spillovers on vertical cooperation, but do
find statistical evidence of the positive relation between appropriability and the
probability of cooperating with customers or suppliers. As a matter of fact, our
results slightly differ from the existing studies in that, while they find a signif-
icant increase in the probability of cooperating with research institutes due to
incoming spillovers, they do not find any significant effect on the propensity to
collaborate with competitors. We suggest two different but correlated explana-
tions to this phenomenon. The first concerns the construction of our spillover
variable, the second relates to the multilevel structure of our model where firms
are nested in sectors. The incoming spillovers are measured by the importance
of publicly available information for the firm’s innovation process, but consider
as a source of information also the question relative to the importance of pro-
fessional or industry associations for innovation activities. Such a construction
of the spillover variable implicitly calls for a higher probability of horizontal co-
operation. Indeed, a firm can exploit much better the information coming from
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an industry association in the context of a cooperative alliance within the same
sector. On the other hand, we hypothesize that the coefficient of our spillover
variable is not significant for vertical cooperation types in that, by definition, the
variable does not consider inter-industry collaboration.
Given the multilevel structure of our model where firms are supposed to be nested
in sectors, the spillover variable plays the most important role. Indeed, the syn-
ergy between this particular source of information and our innovative multilevel
structure might be at the root of such a significant regression coefficient.
In line with empirical findings, firm size is positive and significant in all four
cooperation strategies. Larger firms are more likely to have the right absorptive
capacity required to engage in R&D cooperation, and this effect is stronger for
cooperation with universities and suppliers. In line with previous studies we
used the logarithm form, since it is natural that this effect is attenuated when
the number of employees grows large.
Empirical literature generally found a positive impact of barriers to innovation
such as costs and risks connected to the innovation process on the propensity of
firms to cooperate. The propensity of firms in engaging in R&D cooperations
with universities or other research institutions are expected to be positively cor-
related with the costs of innovation (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Indeed,
the cost sharing motive is found to be an important determinant for firms when
deciding to cooperate with customers or research institutes. On the other hand,
cooperations with customers, other than to access to complementary knowledge,
are aimed to reduce the risk associated with bringing an innovation to the mar-
ket. As a matter of fact, the risk-sharing variable is found to be significantly
positive and the magnitude of the regression coefficient is much larger than the
one of the cost-sharing variable. Further, the risk factor is not significant for the
other three collaborative agreements.
Furthermore, as expected, R&D personnel intensity has a positive effect on the
probability of cooperation with all sorts of partners.
The variables for public financial support for innovation activities have a positive
and significant impact on almost all cooperation strategies. This may suggest






























Table 3.4: Estimation results : Multivariate mixed logit
Suppliers Customers Competitors Institutional
Intercept
-3.541*** -4.691*** -5.718*** -6.085***
(-4.448, -2.568) (-5.721, -3.637) (-7.015, -4.441) (-7.365, -5.045)
rad
0.593*** 0.926*** 0.618*** 0.593***
(0.307, 0.898) (0.621, 1.220) (0.221, 1.054) (0.255, 0.899)
inc
0.280** 0.486*** 0.596** 0.410***
(0.014, 0.577) (0.172, 0.809) (0.196, 1.043) (0.103, 0.756)
size
0.339*** 0.290*** 0.225*** 0.343***
(0.222, 0.461) (0.161, 0.428) (0.068, 0.379) (0.212, 0.489)
spill
0.416 0.539 1.298*** 1.799***
(-0.145, 0.882) (-0.053, 1.193) (0.321, 2.214) (1.021, 2.644)
cost
0.197 0.342* -0.145 0.630***
(-0.118, 0.521) (-0.036, 0.664) (-0.594, 0.267) (0.243, 1.002)
risk
-0.098 0.581*** 0.196 -0.072
(-0.397, 0.226) (0.243, 1.001) (-0.240, 0.704) (-0.393, 0.289)
rdpi
2.184*** 0.713 0.646 2.165**
(0.908, 3.562) (-0.237, 1.648) (-0.540, 1.660) (1.032, 3.464)
fungmt
0.532*** 0.565*** 0.353* 0.724***
(0.254, 0.857) (0.235, 0.891) (-0.009, 0.750) (0.384, 1.030)
funeu
0.641*** 0.301 1.133*** 0.804***
(0.153, 1.188) (-0.218, 0.838) (0.622, 1.646) (0.332, 1.353)
gp
0.411*** 0.1189 0.141 0.494***
(0.106, 0.758) (-0.165, 0.541) (-0.281, 0.601) (0.125, 0.853)
Firm-level Random Intercept
σ̂γ
7.532*** 5.324*** 2.970*** 3.671***
(6.797, 8.297) (4.519, 6.750) (2.443, 3.457) (3.362, 4.615)
Sector-level Random effects (Averages over sectors)
σ̂α0
0.634*** 0.701*** 0.676*** 0.614***
(0.273, 1.665) (0.279, 1.817) (0.245, 1.729) (0.272, 1.633)
σ̂lp
0.326*** 0.329*** 0.382*** 0.324***
(0.210, 0.842) (0.200, 0.855) (0.188, 0.909) (0.200, 0.836)
σ̂HHI
0.638*** 0.709*** 0.684*** 0.644***
(0.257, 1.666) (0.301, 1.917) (0.225, 1.661) (0.279, 1.761)
Note: 95% Posterior Credible Interval (PCI) in brackets; significance codes for the PCIs : 0.01 ‘***’; 0.05 ‘**’; 0.1 ‘*’; DIC = 5516.991
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R&D partnerships, in particular with research institutions. Lastly, we find that
firms belonging to a domestic group are more likely to cooperate with suppliers
or research institutes.
3.5.1 Firm- and Sector-level Heterogeneity
The hypothesis of a more complex structure of the heterogeneity of cooperation
determinants is confirmed by our results. Both firm- and sector-level variances
and covariances are found to be significant, meaning that enterprises within the
same industry share similar characteristics (same random effects), which lead to
correlation between research partners’ choices.
The proportion of variation explained by the firm- and sector-level random inter-
cepts varies across cooperation strategies. The firm- and sector-level variations
of cooperating with suppliers account for the 86.5% and the 2.8%, respectively,
82.0% and 6.6% for cooperating with customers, 71.2% and 3.9% for horizontal
research alliances, and 75.5% and 3.1% are the firm- and sector-level proportions
of residual variance specific of cooperating with a public research institution.
In general, we find that the variance of the firm-level intercept is much larger
than that of the sector-level. Concerning the coefficient estimates of sector-level
variables, namely the Herfindhal index and the measure of legal protection, are
reported at the bottom of Table 3.4. Both the legal protection measures adopted
by the firm and the degree of industry concentration affect their motivation of
combining resources with other firms.
In figure 3.1 we plot the posterior distributions of the sector-level correlations
between the 4 different cooperation strategies. The plots on the left show time
series of the values of 1600 samples of the posterior distribution correlations.
These graphs constitute a powerful visual inspection tool. Indeed, we can exam-
ine these MCMC draws to check that MCMCglmm’s algorithms fitted the data and
our model specification quite well. Indeed, the posterior distributions seem to
be mixing well around the mean values of the correlation coefficients. The plots
on the right show the same data on the correlation parameter draws as marginal
posterior distributions (kernel density estimates).
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Table 3.5: Firm- and Sector-level random effects correlation matrix
Coop. type Suppliers Customers Competitors Institutional
Suppliers
1.000 0.962*** 0.987*** 0.889*
(0.908, 0.988) (0.966, 0.999) (0.839, 0.948)
Customers
1.000 0.926*** 0.740***




Coop. type Suppliers Customers Competitors Institutional
Suppliers
1.000 0.723*** 0.724*** 0.714*
(0.346, 0.974) (0.306, 0.965) (0.310, 0.973)
Customers
1.000 0.708*** 0.741***




Note: 95% Posterior Credible Interval (PCI) in brackets; significance codes for the PCIs : 0.01
‘***’; 0.05 ‘**’; 0.1 ‘*’.
The values of correlations between the different cooperation strategies at the
both firm- and sector-level are summarized in Table 3.5. The upper part of
the table reports the correlation between cooperation choices at the level of the
enterprise. The firm-specific correlation coefficients are on average 30% higher
the sector-specific correlation coefficients.
Additionally, comparing the estimates of the multivariate mixed logit with the
multivariate probit (Table 3.7), we notice that, in general, for all cooperation
strategies, developing radical innovation or performing imitative innovations do
not have the the same strong effect on the propensity to cooperate as with the
multivariate mixed logit estimates. Regression coefficients’ estimates are statis-
tically significant at the 5% only for cooperations with customers or suppliers.
Another distinguishing feature of the multivariate probit consists in the fact that
industry legal protection does not seem to play any remarkable role in enhancing
the chance to cooperate with suppliers, competitors or research institutes. On
the other hand, the level of industry concentration (HHI) appears to have a posi-
tive and significant impact on each of the R&D alliances, except for the one with
competitors. This result is counterintuitive as we would expect a significant and
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high effect of the market concentration especially on the probability to cooperate
horizontally with competitors, as such an alliance would offer a greater scope for
internalization of spillovers (Hernán et al., 2003).
3.6 Evaluating the impact of public funding on
innovative output
The success of all stages of innovation should be perceived as the outcome of a
collaborative occurrence, arising from cognitive proximity (Cohen and Levinthal,
1990). Proximity can be defined, other than from a geographical perspective, in
terms of organizational and institutional proximity. In particular, (Dosi, 1999)
claims that the production of innovative output is influenced by the “social em-
beddedness” of firms’ routines and strategies. Simply put, the innovativeness of
a firm is likely to be driven by socially specific factors, such as the nature of the
local labor markets, workforce training institutions, financial institutions, mech-
anisms governing the support of business start-ups and development, science and
technology policies, inter-firm and firminstitutional interactions.
Large part of European policy measures supporting innovation activities focus
on both the promotion of R&D cooperation between the actors of the innovation
system (which includes enterprises, universities, and research institutes), and
on the improvement of the conditions for the uptake of innovations and/or to
improve the articulation of demand in order to spur innovations and the diffusion
of innovations.
Policy evaluation of European initiatives, regional, or national innovation policies
usually relies on counterfactual analysis, and on the implementation of econo-
metric techniques such as matching (Heckman et al., 1998; Klette et al., 2000;
Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). Undertaking such a systematic approach goes
beyond the scope of this paper. We rather want to show how the proposed hier-
archical structure has an impact on the measured effects innovation policies on
both cooperation propensity and innovative output.
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In particular, in this paragraph, we investigate the relationship between innova-
tive output, measured as the percentage of firm’s total turnover from goods and
service innovations introduced during 2004 to 2006 that were new to the firm’s
market (Inno), and innovative input, simply measured by the R&D personnel
intensity (rdpi). We then control for public financial support for innovation ac-
tivities at different levels of government (regional, funloc; central government,
fungmt; European Union, funeu) and for cooperation with four types of part-
ners. Therefore, the linear mixed model describing the impact of public funding
on innovative sales is:
Innoij = β0 + β
′
cyij + βrrdpiij + α
′
jFij + νij , (3.6)
where yij = (y
1
ij, . . . , y
4
ij)
′ is the vector of 4 binary variables taking value 1 when
one of the 4 cooperation partner is selected. As before, we define αj as a normally
distributed sector-level random effect, and Fij = (funlocij, fungmtij, funeuij)
′
as the vector of dummies proxing whether the firm received a funding from a
regional, governmental, or European institution. The error term νij is assumed
to be normally distributed.
Table 3.6 reports the estimates of two models. The first column displays esti-
mated mean values and 95% posterior intervals of a linear mixed model without
sector-level random components25. The second column presents estimates of a
linear mixed model with random effects and random intercept. Specifically, the
effect of variables proxying for regional, central government and European Union
R&D support (funloc, fungmt, funeu) is considered to be random at the sec-
toral level. We also allow for the sector-specific intercept to be random.
Results confirm our beliefs. When considering a hierarchical framework, the pol-
icy interventions are relevant for innovative output. The realizations of sectoral
intercept and slopes of the policy coefficients are expected to lie in 95% positive
intervals. That is, the marginal effect of a regional innovation policy on the per-
centage of innovative turnover will be between 0.032 and 0.072. The same way
of reasoning applies for the other policies.
25Since the MLE estimator and the mean of the posterior are asymptotically equivalent and
their difference depends on the inverse of the square root of the sample size, the larger the
sample size the narrower this difference. As our sample is pretty large (1929 observations), this
difference is likely to be negligible
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Table 3.6: Estimation results : Mixed linear model
Dep. var.:YInno Fixed Coefficients Random Coefficients
Cosupp
-0.011 -0.008
(-0.030, 0.012) (-0.029, 0.012)
Cocust
0.030*** 0.025**
(0.008, 0.051) (0.004, 0.047)
Cocomp
-0.007 -0.007
( -0.030, 0.020) (-0.032, 0.015)
Coinst
0.022** 0.027***
(0.002, 0.043) (0.006, 0.048)
rdpi
0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002, 0.013) ( 0.003, 0.014)
funloc
0.006 0.050***(σ̂loc)
(-0.017, 0.028) (0.032, 0.072)
fungmt
0.020*** 0.045***(σ̂gmt)
(0.003, 0.035) (0.029, 0.062)
funeu
0.007 0.054***(σ̂eu)
(-0.018, 0.033) (0.034, 0.078)
Intercept
0.045*** 0.070***(σ̂int)
(0.034, 0.057) (0.039, 0.107)
DIC -1480.567 -1477.612
Note: 95% Posterior Credible Interval (PCI) in brackets; significance codes for the PCIs : 0.01
‘***’; 0.05 ‘**’; 0.1 ‘*’
It is also interesting to note that, when disregarding the sector-specific random
effects(first column), the central government R&D policy resulted to have the
higher (and statistically significant at 1% level) marginal effect on innovative
output (0.020, compared with 0.006 for regional funding, and 0.007 for Euro-
pean funding). However, when turning to our multilevel approach that can take
into account organizational proximities within sectors, the impact of European
Union fundings has the biggest HPD interval (0.034, 0.078). European scientific
and technological policies increase the innovative sales by a value falling in the
aforementioned interval.
Chapter 3. Multilevel heterogeneity of the R&D cooperation determinants 73
3.7 Conclusions
Using data from the last available 2006 edition of the Community Innovation
Survey for the Netherlands, this paper contributes to the existing empirical lit-
erature, by proposing a methodology to study the determinants of innovative
collaborative agreements and to assess the impact of public financial support to
R&D. In particular, we explore the firm- and the sector- level heterogeneity of the
determinants of either forming an R&D alliance, or selling innovative products,
by considering a (generalized) linear mixed model.
The two steps of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In the first stage, we
investigate the relationship between the factors driving the propensity to collab-
orate with different research partners, assuming a multivariate hierarchical logit
model. The second step confirms the key role of the assumed multilevel struc-
ture, by considering the relationship between innovative output and innovative
input, controlling for public financial support to innovation activities at different
levels of government.
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model the both firm- and sector-
level heterogeneity in the determinants of R&D partner’s choices and innovation
output.
Our hypothesis of a heterogeneity across firms and sectors is confirmed by the
results. All covariances are found to be significant. In other words, firms within
the same industry share similar characteristics (same random effects), which lead
to correlation between research partners’ choices.
This confirms that R&D cooperation, as well as the innovative production, is a
firm-level process, where a strong sectoral specificity exists.
Taking into account this sectoral-organizational proximity can help assessing the
right impact of R&D policies on innovative output. We have seen that, when
using the multilevel approach the impact of public fundings has a positive and
significant sign, while, when omitting this nested framework the policies have a
poor effect on innovative turnover.
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Moreover, our suggested empirical framework can be brought to a deeper level of
analysis, if data on markets were observed. As a matter of fact, understanding
market dynamics could be the key to create more innovation-friendly market
conditions that are necessary to reduce the time-to-market of new goods and to
enable emerging sectors and/or markets to grow faster.
In these markets, for example, the removal of barriers would essentially con-
tribute to the competitive process and lead to the emergence of new markets.
Competitiveness is here meant not only as the ability of the firm to come up with
innovation from its internal technological strength, but also on its ability to access
the innovation networking, that, as we have shown, depends on sector-specific
networking and proximity (and, presumably, also on market-specific characteris-
tics).
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Variable Description
• Cooperation: Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the firm has declared
to cooperate with at least one of the possible research partners, i.e., sup-
pliers, clients, competitors, consultors, universities, research institutes.
• Cooperation with competitors : Dummy variable which takes the value 1
when the firm has actively participated with its competitors on innovation
activities.
• Cooperation with customers : Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when
the firm has actively participated with its clients or customers on innovation
activities.
• Cooperation with suppliers : Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when
the firm has actively participated with its suppliers of equipment, materials,
components, or software on innovation activities.
• Cooperation with research institutions : Dummy variable which takes the
value 1 when the firm has actively participated with universities or other
higher education institutions, or government or public research institutes
on innovation activities.
• Incoming Spillovers : Variable which takes the value 0 if innovation ideas
are not originated by Professional conferences, exhibitions, meetings and
journals, professional and industry associations. The variable was originally
coded from 0 (not used) to 3 (highly important), and we recoded in 0, 1/3,
2/3, 1.
• Legal Protection: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm applied
for a patent, registered an industrial design, or a trademark, or claimed a
copyright.
• Size: Log of number of employees of the firm.
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• Cost : Variable measuring the importance of the costs of innovation, or
the lack of funds, or access to finance in hampering the firm’s innovation
activities or projects or influencing the decision not to innovate. The orig-
inal variable takes values between 1 (high) and 4 (not relevant). Rescaled
between 0 (not relevant) and 1 (high).
• Risk : Variable measuring the importance of the uncertainty of the demand
for innovative goods or services in hampering the firm’s innovation activities
or projects or influencing the decision not to innovate. The original variable
takes values between 1 (high) and 4 (not relevant). Rescaled between 0 (not
relevant) and 1 (high).
• Radical innovator : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the enterprise
introduced a new or significantly improved good or service onto its reference
market before the competitors.
• Incremental innovator : Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the enterprise
introduced a new or significantly improved good or service that was already
available from the competitors in its reference market.
• Absorptive capacity : It is proxied by R&D personnel intensity, measured
as the ratio between the log of researchers (full time equivalent) and the
size of the firm.
• Enterprise Group: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is part
of an enterprise group. A group consists of two or more legally defined
enterprises under common ownership. Each enterprise in the group may
serve different markets, as with national or regional subsidiaries, or serve
different product markets. The head office is also part of an enterprise
group.
• Public funding
– Regional funding : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm received
any public financial support for innovation activities from local or
regional authorities;
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– National funding : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm received
any public financial support for innovation activities from central gov-
ernment (including central government agencies or ministries);
– European funding : Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm received
any public financial support for innovation activities from the Euro-
pean Union.
• Industry concentration: As a measure of industry concentration we adopt
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, computed as the sum of the squared firms’
market shares.
• Innovative output : Innovation output is proxied by the percentage of total
turnover from product or process innovation (new to the firm and/or to
the market)
3.8.2 Bayesian Multivariate Mixed Logit Model
The maximum likelihood method is the standard approach for statistical infer-
ence in the mixed effects model. In order to maximize the sample likelihood,
integration over the random-effects distribution must be performed. Yet, there
exists no analytical solution for the intractable integral in equation (3.5). As a
result, estimation is much more complicated than in models for continuous nor-
mally distributed outcomes where the solution can be expressed in closed form.
Various approximations for evaluating the integral over the random-effects dis-
tribution have been proposed in the literature; many of these are reviewed in
Rodŕıguez and Goldman (1995).
Simulation methods are also popular techniques to estimate mixed effects mod-
els (Train, 2009). The unconditional probabilities in equation (3.5) are approxi-
mated through simulation for any given value θ of the parameters of the mixing
distribution f(α|θ). Such methods fall under the rubric of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) algorithms.
In this paper we adopt a Bayesian approach and explore the MCMC fitting of the
multivariate mixed logit model. One advantage of the Bayesian approach over
its frequentist counterpart includes the fact that the Bayesian procedures do not
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require maximization of any function. For complicated random effects structures,
computation of a single maximum likelihood fit can be expensive, making the
simulation of statistics of interest computationally prohibitive. Second, with
Bayesian procedures, estimation properties, such as consistency and efficiency,
can be attained under more relaxed conditions than with classical procedures.
As shown in Train (2009) (Chapter 10), consistency of the Maximum Simulated
Likelihood (MSL) estimator depends on the relationship between the number
of draws that are used in the simulation and the sample size. If the number
of draws is considered fixed, then the MSL estimator does not converge to the
true parameters, because of the simulation bias. The simulation bias disappears
as the sample size rises without bound together with the number of draws. In
contrast, the Bayesian estimators are consistent for a fixed number of draws used
in simulation and are efficient if the number of draws rises at any rate with sample
size.
Following the Bayesian approach, the model parameters β, α, G, summarized in
the vector θ, are treated as random variables. The assumed distributions for the
parameters, called prior distributions and denoted by f(θ), borrow information
from past studies, logic, or from the researcher’s ideas about the values of these
parameters. Therefore, the prior distribution represents how likely the researcher
thinks it is for the parameters to take a particular value, over all possible val-
ues that the parameters can take. Bayesian inference is based on the posterior
distribution, f(θ|y), which is the conditional distribution of the conjectured, but
unknown, parameters θ, given the observed data y = y1, . . . , yn.
The choice of a prior distribution f(θ) affects Bayesian estimation. In other
words, Bayesian inference may be influenced by a “strong” prior. In absence of
any prior information, a non-informative prior is chosen (f(θ) ∝ 1)) and Bayesian
inference is asymptotically equivalent to likelihood inference. In practice, we al-
ways specify a diffuse prior for β, and try different values of the set of parameters
α, G, as a sensitivity analysis.
To estimate the parameters of the Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM)
defined in Section 4 following a Bayesian approach (Zeger and Karim, 1991; Gel-
man et al., 2003), we use the R package MCMCglmm (Hadfield and Kruuk, 2010).
The default prior chosen by MCMCglmm for the regression model parameters βc is
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a non-informative, normal distribution N(0, 1e+ 10)26, while for both the resid-
ual and random-effect variance matrices a diffuse inverse-Wishart distribution is
assumed, which is commonly used in practice. Then, assuming that the priors
are independent,
f(β, G) = f(β)f(G), (3.7)



















The R package MCMCglmm generate samples from the posterior distribution using
Metropolis-Hastings updates (for more details on the sampling schemes, see Had-
field and Kruuk (2010)). Beginning with the starting values (β(0),α(0),W (0)), af-
ter a warm-up (also called ”burn-in”) period, we store a sample of (β,α,W ) from
the posterior distribution. Once we generate a large number of samples, the pos-
terior mean and posterior covariance can be approximated by the sample mean
and the sample covariance based on the simulated samples. Convergence of the
MCMC sampling scheme was assessed using empirical and test-based approaches
(Heidelberger and Welch, 1983; Geweke, 1992). Results from convergence diag-
nostics indicated that it was sufficient to burn-in the first 15,000 samples and
take the subsequent 1,600 samples for inference.
26One of the many advantages of the package MCMCglmm resides in the great flexibility in
the specification of various residual and random-effect variance structures. MCMCglmm allows
variance structures of the form G=V⊗A: unstructured and completely parameterized covari-
ance matrices. However, binary responses pose a special problem because the residual variance
cannot be estimated because the variance is uniquely determined by the mean. Therefore,
following Hadfield and Kruuk (2010), we apply restrictions on the prior distribution of the
residual covariance matrix. In particular, we fix the parameters of the prior distribution at
some value (1 for variances and 0 for covariances).
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Figure 3.1: Correlation Estimates
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Table 3.7: Estimation results : Multivariate probit
Variable Customers Suppliers Competitors Institutional
rad 0.351∗∗∗ (0.072) 0.243∗∗∗ (0.074) 0.198∗ (0.108) 0.161 (0.104)
inc 0.242∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.090 (0.061) 0.170∗ (0.091) 0.138∗ (0.073)
size 0.110∗∗ (0.043) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.028)
spill 0.389∗∗ (0.183) 0.474∗∗∗ (0.076) 0.482∗ (0.264) 0.942∗∗∗ (0.198)
cost 0.153∗∗ (0.076) 0.157∗ (0.080) -0.083 (0.121) 0.293∗∗ (0.115)
risk 0.259∗∗∗ (0.072) -0.135∗∗∗ (0.052) 0.010 (0.099) -0.053 (0.127)
rdpi 0.173 (0.233) 0.574∗∗∗ (0.213) 0.273 (0.295) 0.744∗∗∗ (0.163)
fungmt 0.168∗∗ (0.067) 0.152∗∗ (0.074) 0.085 (0.112) 0.236∗∗ (0.095)
funeu 0.199 (0.151) 0.420∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.557∗∗∗ (0.143) 0.438∗∗∗ (0.113)
gp 0.114 (0.094) 0.208∗∗ (0.097) 0.044 (0.140) 0.277∗∗∗ (0.105)
lp 0.151∗∗∗ (0.051) 0.090 (0.055) 0.047 (0.069) 0.141∗ (0.074)
HHI 0.984∗∗∗ (0.346) 0.449∗∗ (0.183) 0.341 (0.366) 0.792∗∗∗ (0.232)
Intercept -2.276∗∗∗ (0.158) -1.866∗∗∗ (0.155) -2.601∗∗∗ (0.193) -3.086∗∗∗ (0.243)
Correlations Matrix
Customers Suppliers Competitors Institutional
Customers 1 0.761 ∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.637 ∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.640 ∗∗∗ (0.037)
Suppliers 1 0.652 ∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.686 ∗∗∗ (0.027)
Competitors 1 0.615 ∗∗∗ (0.051)






Abstract. This paper investigate the distribution of the fixed and sunk costs
associated with the firm–level decisions of innovating, spending, and cooperat-
ing in R&D, adopting a dynamic structural framework. The basic idea of the
paper is to model the firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and to innovate with
a dynamic discrete choice model. None of the existing studies on heterogene-
ity of cooperation strategies or innovation processes deals with the nontrivial
dynamics deriving from uncertainty and sunk costs of investments. Identifying
the firms’ primitives on productivity and investment decisions is key to have an
encompassing understanding on what are the determinants on which the firm
bases its choice to innovate and/or cooperate. Additionally, the suggested struc-
tural framework of firm heterogeneity in cost functions offers a straightforward
extension to policy impact evaluation.
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4.1 Introduction
An important source of productivity differentials across firms is related to R&D
and innovation activities. Many authors have studied the connection between
spending for R&D and productivity growth (Griliches, 1980; Jones and Williams,
1998; Hall and Mairesse, 1995; Crépon et al., 1998). As a result, a large number
of empirical studies estimates the effect of R&D investment on such growth, find-
ing that R&D spending has a significantly positive effect on productivity growth,
with a rate of return that is about the same size as (or to some extent larger than)
the rate of return on conventional investments. Crépon et al. (1998), examining
the structural links between productivity, innovation input, and innovation out-
put at the firm level, find that the firm innovation output rises with its research
efforts, and the firm productivity correlates positively with a higher innovative
output.
Nonetheless, before Ericson and Pakes (1995), most of the empirical literature
in industry dynamics assumes that firms are endowed with an exogenous level of
productivity. The “lucky” firms with high productivity survive and prosper, the
others fail, and eventually exit the market.
The modern IO literature relaxes this exogeneity assumption by letting the pro-
ductivity to be dependent on the investment decisions, so as to enhance the
firms’ survival chance (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Doraszelski and Jaumandreu,
2008; Aw et al., 2011). Typically, in this context, the investment taken into con-
sideration is past R&D expenditure (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2008), or both
R&D expenditure and export market participation (Aw et al., 2011). However,
the firm that wants to survive must not only be innovative, but also ready to
outsource knowledge and develop research networks. In fact, firms increasingly
rely on the external acquisition of new technological knowledge, as the insti-
tutional locations of such resources can be quite disparate. Although not the
primary source of produced knowledge, R&D outsourcing27 (or external R&D)
27R&D outsourcing refers to the contractually agreed, non-gratuitous and temporary per-
formance of R&D tasks for a client primarily by private contract research and technology
organizations, but also by some private non-profit and related hybrid organizations (Howells,
1999; Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010)
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has considerably increased in importance and accounts for a substantial share of
the total innovation expenditure in a large number of firms.28
Therefore, in this paper we construct a model where firms invest in R&D ac-
tivities with or without a research partner to improve their productivity levels.
In particular, we develop and estimate a structural dynamic monopoly model
to quantify the linkages between R&D spending, innovation and cooperation in-
vestment choices, and endogenous productivity. To our knowledge, our paper
constitutes the first attempt to explicitly model the different collaborative R&D
investment decisions adopting a dynamic structural framework.
All the other empirical studies aimed at determining whether research collabora-
tions affect firm-level productivity rely on reduced-form regression approach. For
example, Belderbos et al. (2004b), using data from two waves of the Dutch Com-
munity Innovation Survey (1996, 1998), analyze the impact of R&D cooperation
on firm performance, regressing two measures of firm-level productivity growth
on four different cooperation strategies. They also control for the effect of both
own R&D efforts as well as the impact of incoming knowledge flows that are not
due to cooperation. Carboni (2012) explores the variables that determine a firms
R&D collaborative expenditure, in a regression analysis framework, correcting
for heteroscedasticity and non-normality when dealing with a large number of
zero response data.
Differently from these studies, the model we propose derives the firms’ optimal
R&D investment decisions where these depend on the past R&D activities and
on the past level of productivity. Additionally, within the suggested framework
we are able to model and retrieve the current fixed or sunk costs relative to the
different (collaborative) R&D activities.
The literature on R&D cooperation shows that the risks and costs of innova-
tion and the need to exploit complementary resources are the main motives
for cooperative behavior, and therefore, that cooperative behavior may be posi-
tively related to a number of obstacles such as high risks and cost of innovation
(Amoroso, 2011; Belderbos et al., 2004a,b). R&D cooperations, in fact, allow
28Source: Eurostat. “Innovation in Europe. Results for the EU, Iceland and Norway.”
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firms to share costs or to reduce risks of innovation. In this regard, we hypothe-
size that cooperating in research could reduce both the fixed and the sunk costs
of introducing an innovation in the market.
We merge data on sales and factor inputs of Dutch manufacturing firms ex-
tracted from the Production Survey (PS), and three waves of the Community
Innovation Survey (CIS) for the Netherlands, covering the period from 2002 to
2008. The leading sectors (chemicals, agri-food, transport, high-tech) in the
Dutch manufacturing industry heavily depend on research and innovation, and
these are, in turn, driven by a wide range of factors, such as firm performance,
market conditions, policy interventions, and government requirements to reduce
environmental damages. In this paper, we assume the firm bases its decision of
engaging in R&D or in innovation with or without a research partner on past
choices, firm-level total factor productivity, and a demand shifter, proxying for
the industry characteristics.
In Section 2 we present the model that we use to retrieve information on both
fixed and sunk costs, and consequently on the optimal R&D, innovation, and
cooperation decisions. In Section 3, we discuss the empirical strategy used to
retrieve estimates of the static parameters of the model. Namely, we illustrate
how we obtain a measure of firm-level productivity, demand elasticity, and an
aggregate demand shifter. Moreover, we present estimates of the fixed costs
associated with each investment choice, in the static case, i.e., when the firm
does not take into account the future payoffs in its profits maximization. Section
4 describes the steps of the algorithm developed by Imai et al. (2009) that is
used to obtain the dynamic parameters estimates. Section 4 and 5 describe the
data and the results, respectively. In Section 6 we present the results for a policy
simulation and the last section concludes.
4.2 Structural Framework
The empirical model builds on the class of models of dynamic entry games in IO,
where the dependent variable is the firm’s decision to enter or not in a market.
In the same spirit, this paper defines the entry decision as the adoption of a set
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of discrete decisions: investing in research and development (R&D), cooperat-
ing, innovating, and innovation cooperation. These decisions are assumed to be
costly to reverse and, therefore, associated with sunk costs. As firms are assumed
to be forward looking, they take into account the implications of their decisions
(and the associated costs) on their future payoffs. Time is discrete and indexed
by t. The single-agent dynamic optimization problem is solved for the N firms
operating in the market, which we index by i ∈ I = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Following
the standard setting of Ericson and Pakes (1995), and adapting it to a monop-
olistic competitive setting, firms compete on two different dimensions: a static
and a dynamic dimension. Within the dynamic dimension, a firm makes the
investment choice indexed by k ∈ {na, rd, c, d, cd}, where the vector of choices is
defined as ait = (nait, rdit, cit, dit, cdit)
′, with ait ∈ Ai ≡ {0, 1}
5. The firm-specific
choice nait takes value one if the firm does not engage in any activity other than
operating in the market; rdit takes value one if the firm decides to spend in R&D;
choices cit and dit match firms’ decisions to start a research collaboration and to
invest in a technological upgrade, respectively; action cdit tags the decision to
both innovate and cooperate (with either another firm or a research institute or
a supplier/customer).
4.2.1 Static decisions
In every period, firms are competing in prices in a static Bertrand model. Let
Pit, the price, be the static decision variable of firm i at time t. The demand














t are the sector
j aggregate production and price index, respectively, η < −1 is the constant
elasticity of demand, and udit is a demand shock.
The production function is assumed to take the form of a Cobb-Douglas, with
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where Kit denotes capital, Lit labor, and Mit intermediate goods, consisting of
materials and energy, for firm i at period t. θiKt, θiLt, θiMt are the elasticities of
output with respect to capital, labor, and intermediate goods, respectively. Ait
represents the Hicksian neutral efficiency level of firm i at time t. The logarithm
of Ait is defined as Ait ≡ exp(θ0 + ωit) and is defined as the sum of the mean
productivity level across firms and over time, θ0, and the productivity shock
which is observable by the firm, but not to the econometrician (for example,
managerial ability, quality of research), ωit..
Following the literature on imperfect competition in both product and labor
markets (Bughin, 1993, 1996; Crépon et al., 2002; Dobbelaere, 2004; Abraham
et al., 2009; Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2011; Amoroso et al., 2012), we relax the
conventional assumption of perfect competition in the labor market, allowing
both firms and workers’ union to have some market power. The workers bargain
with the firm over both the levels of employment, Lit, and of the wage, Wit.
Additionally, we define the firm level profits as
Πit ≡ PitQit −WitLit − FC(Kit,Mit, ait), (4.3)
where FC(·) are the (avoidable) fixed costs (costs that do not vary with the quan-
tity of output produced, but are not irrevocably committed; (Wang and Yang,
2001)), depending on capital, material, and innovative investment. Moreover, we
define the union’s utility function as
Uit(Wit, Lit) ≡ Lit(Wit − W̄it),
where W̄it is the reservation wage. Finally, the efficient bargaining model can be
written as a weighted average of the logarithms of workers’ aggregate gain from
union membership and the firm’s profits:
max
Lit,Wit
[φit log(Uit(Wit, Lit)) + (1− φit) logΠit] ,
where φit ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of union bargaining power. In the static setting,
the firm maximizes only with respect to the variable costs, namely, the cost of
labor. Amoroso et al. (2012) show that, maximizing with respect to labor, and
taking into account the demand curve faced by the monopolistically competitive
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(1− µWit ). (4.4)




markup29 From (4.4), after solving for Lit (see technical appendix), we derive the























Substituting (4.5) into (4.3), taking into account (4.2), and assuming, for sim-
plicity, that the elasticity of labor is constant across firms and time, we obtain
the final short-run profit function:




























, and δ ≡ η/(η − θiLt(η − 1)).
4.2.2 Dynamic decisions
The decisions of doing R&D, cooperating, or innovating cannot be revoked, so we
assume the costs associated with these actions to be sunk. We define the vector
of fixed costs paid in case of investment in research, cooperation, innovation, or










We also define the vector of sunk costs associated with every investment choice









′. In particular, we assume that,
besides the fixed and sunk costs of R&D and innovation, there are sunk costs of
finding an efficient research partner, or fixed costs of maintaining the research
alliance, such as managing the contractual costs (transaction costs).
29In their paper, Amoroso et al. (2012) also show how, maximizing with respect to wages
leads to an expression of the wage markup as a function of the bargaining parameter, φit, and
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Given their level of productivity, capital, materials, and present and past knowl-
edge investment decisions, ait and ait−1, the firm faces the following profit func-
tion:
Π(ait, ait−1, ωit,Wit, Kit,Mit, ψt) =
ΠSR(ωit,Wit, Kit,Mit, ψt)− FC(Kit,Mit, ait)− SC(ait, ait−1)
≡ ΠSR(ωit,Wit, Kit,Mit, ψt)− F̃C(Kit,Mit)
−θ′FCi ait − θ
′SC
i (1− ait−1)ait, (4.7)




To simplify the framework, while retaining the salient features of the model, we
make a set of assumptions. First, we omit the firm-level entry/exit decisions.
Moreover, to reduce the dimensionality of the state vector on which firms are
assumed to base their decisions, we consider a simpler framework, featuring im-
perfect competition only on the output market, and where capital and materials
are assumed to be flexible inputs, not subject to adjustment costs. Assuming
that the productivity, ωit, and the aggregate state, ψt, are sufficient statistics for
predicting the expected future profits, the short-run profit function under these
restrictions is derived in the Appendix and can be written as
Π(ait, ait−1, ωit, ψt) = ϕψt exp(ωit)
−(1+η) − θ′FCi ait − θ
′SC
i (1− ait−1)ait, (4.8)







4.2.2.1 State variables transition functions
We assume that the next period state of the aggregate variable ψt depends only
on the current state. In particular, we specify the evolution of the aggregate
state variable as
ψt = f(ψt−1) = µ0 + ρψt−1 + ǫψ, (4.9)
where ǫψ is a normally distributed error term. Following Santos (2009), the





2), represents the aggregate uncertainty of the
industry affecting the firm’s investment choice.
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Concerning the productivity, we follow Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2008), and
Aw et al. (2011), and model the evolution of the firm’s productivity as a Markov
process, allowing for the productivity to be affected by firms’ past choices of inno-
vation, cooperation, and R&D.30 We define the evolution process of productivity
level ωit of firm i at time t as:
ωit ≡ ω(ωit−1, ait−1) + ξit (4.10)
where ξit is the normally distributed stochastic shock to productivity, and ω(·)
is approximated by a third degree polynomial.
In particular, we propose the evolution process of productivity level ωit of firm
i at time t as a nonlinearly persistent process, depending on a broader set of
R&D activities, namely (cooperative) research and innovation. The productivity
transition becomes:
ωit = ω(ωit−1, cit−1, dit−1, cdit−1, rdit−1) + ξit (4.11)




it−1 + β4cit−1 + β5dit−1
+β6cit−1dit−1 + β7rdit−1 + ξit.
The firm profit function as in (4.7) related to the set of choices a do not only differ
in their fixed costs intercepts, but also in their arguments. In fact, the produc-
tivity process assumed in (4.11) depends on both the past level of productivity,
and on the type of technological upgrade. Therefore, the variable ωit associated
with one choice might be different from that of an alternative investment choice.
Figure 4.1 reports the schematic representation of what the profile of all the opti-
mal strategies for firm i and the relative payoffs, given the levels of productivity,
could look like. The firms with a productivity level above a certain threshold de-
cide to either invest in R&D (ωit > ω
rd), or to cooperate with a research partner
(ωit > ω
c), as it might provide higher profits than doing R&D by themselves.
30Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2008) relax the exogeneity assumption usually made about
productivity in the production function literature (see Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003), Ackerberg et al. (2006)), by letting the R&D spending and related activities to
determine the differences in and the evolution of productivity across firms and over time. Aw
et al. (2011) take a step further and assume that productivity evolves as a Markov process
which depends on both investments in R&D and export market participation.
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Cooperating yields higher profits since firms reduce the costs and associated risks
of research by sharing them. Enterprises observing a level of productivity high
enough to bear the sunk costs of introducing an innovation, invest in a product or
process improvement that offers a greater performance or a reduced cost of pro-
duction (ωit > ω
d). Firms with productivity ωit > ω
cd engage in both activities
and are thus assumed to be the most productive.
4.2.2.2 Value and policy functions
To retrieve information about the sunk costs of R&D, innovating, and cooperat-
ing, and to identify the evolution of the productivity states depending on firms’
research investment policies, we consider a dynamic programming problem in
which a firm i makes a series of discrete choices over its infinite lifetime.
Let ait be the control variable and let S be the set of space state points and let the
firms’ characteristics sit be an element of S. To simplify the framework, without
losing the generality of the model, we assume that the state of firm i at time t is
defined only by the level of productivity, ωit, the industry competition proxied
by the aggregate state ψt, and the past investment actions, ait−1; therefore the
state vector is summarized as sit = (ωit, ψt, ait−1). To fit the model to the
data, we need to add unobserved heterogeneity. In particular, we introduce the
vector of payoff shocks ǫit = {ǫit(k)}k∈{na,rd,c,d,cd} observed only by the firm. The
unobserved characteristics ǫit are independently and identically distributed over
time with continuous support and multivariate distribution function Fǫ(ǫit). In
particular, I assume that ǫit’s are i.i.d. extreme value distributed and enter the
profit function in an additively separable way. These assumptions are not strictly
necessary, but useful as they lead to a closed form likelihood function and a closed
form expression for the expected maximum of the choice-specific value functions.
The observed state variable ωit evolves as a Markov process depending stochas-
tically on the choices of the firm because of the assumption in equation (4.10)
with the cumulative distribution function given by Fω(ωit+1|ωit, ait). On the other
hand, the stochastic evolution of the aggregate state is assumed to be indepen-
dent from the research activities, and therefore can be expressed as Fψ(ψt+1|ψt).
Moreover, since we do not know the firm–level production technology, we assume
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the sunk costs of R&D, innovating, and of partnering in research to be drawn
from a known joint distribution FSC(θ
SC
i ).
Let us define θΠi ≡ ((θ
FC
i )
′, (θSC)′)′, and θΠ ≡ {θΠi}i=1,...,N as the matrix of
choice- and firm-specific parameters that describe the profit function in (4.7).






′ ∈ Θ be the vector of the parameters of
interest, where vec(θΠ) is the vectorization of the θΠ matrix, and where θω and
θψ are vectors of parameters that describe the transition probability functions
Fω and Fψ, respectively, θǫ represents the parameters in the distribution of Fǫ,
and β is the rate at which the firm discounts future profits.
Assuming that firms behave optimally, the value function of firm i corresponds
to the maximum of the expected discounted sum of profits, conditional on the
current level of productivity and market indexes:






βτ−t (Π(aiτ , siτ ; θΠi) + ǫiτ ) |sit, ǫit
]
(4.12)
where β ∈ (0, 1), and Π(ait, sit; θΠi) + ǫit are the current profits of firm i with
productivity level ωit, in market aggregate condition ψt, choosing investment ait.
The problem is to determine, for allN firms, the set of optimal stationary decision
rules α = {αi}
N
i=1, where αi : S → Ai, that solves the stochastic/multiperiod
optimization problem expressed in (4.12). The method of dynamic programming
offers the advantage of translating the optimization problem in (4.12) into a
sequence of simpler deterministic/static optimization problems, where for β ∈
(0, 1) and for bounded Π(·), the value of the objective function can be written
(suppressing the subscript i) in the form of a Bellman equation:
V (a, s, ǫ; θ) = Π(a, s; θΠ) + ǫ+ βEs′,ǫ′ [V (s
′; θ)|s, a] (4.13)
V (s, ǫ; θ) = max
a∈A
V (a, s, ǫ; θ)
where s′ and ǫ′ denote the next period state and shock. Therefore, when con-
ditioning on the value of the state and control variables, the optimal decisions
of the firm do not depend on time t, but only on current and next period state
variables. The assumption of the existence of a state variable that is designed to
capture the productive and competitive environment faced by the firm at each
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point might be quite restrictive in the context of technological innovation. How-
ever, as in this paper, we consider the dynamic optimization problem of a single
agent, the stationary dynamic programming framework could still capture the
salient features of such a structural model.
The expected value function for next period is equal to:
Es′,ǫ′ [V (s





V (s′, ǫ′; θ)dFǫ(ǫ
′; θǫ)dFs(s
′|s, a; θ), (4.14)
where dFs(s
′|s, a; θ) ≡ dFω(ω
′|ω, a; θω)dFψ(ψ
′|ψ; θψ). Given that the optimal
strategy, α(s, ǫ), satisfies
α(s, ǫ) = argmax
a∈A
V (a, s, ǫ; θ),




t=1, in order to estimate θ, we
construct the likelihood as the product of firms’ conditional choice probabilities
(CCPs), Pit(ait|sit; θ), as
Pit(ait|sit; θ) ≡ Pr(ǫ : V (ait, sit; θ) ≥ V (ãit, sit; θ)), ∀ãit
= Pr(ǫ : ait = α(sit, ǫit))
=
∫ 1{ait = α(sit, ǫit)}dFǫ.







Moreover, since ǫ follows a joint Gumbel (extreme value type I) distribution,
independent across alternatives k, the likelihood increment for firm i is
Pit(ait|sit; θ) =
exp {V (ãit, sit; θ)}∑
ait 6=ãit
exp {V (ait, sit; θ)}
. (4.16)
In the next section, we discuss the empirical strategy to estimate the static struc-
tural parameters, namely, the demand elasticity, the wage markup, the aggregate
state proxying the industry competitive environment, the productivity evolution
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parameters, the fixed costs, and the dynamic parameters, i.e., the sunk costs,
and the discount factor.
4.3 The estimation procedure
Estimation is done in three steps. In the first step, we estimate a production
function that allows us to retrieve estimates of the firm-level productivity, ωit, the
parameters describing the aggregate state and productivity evolution processes,
f(ψt−1), and ω(ωit−1, ait−1), repectively, and the structural parameters needed
to construct the profit function as in (4.6). In the second step, we retrieve the
management costs concerning the research activity adopted by the firm. In the
last step, we obtain estimates of the dynamic structural parameters, θΠ, θω, θψ, θǫ,
by numerical approximation of the solution to the dynamic programming problem
at trial parameters.
4.3.1 Step 1: Static parameters
The production function and the demand parameters are estimated with the
method proposed by Amoroso et al. (2012). Within the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function framework, they relax the conventional assumption of perfect
competition in the labor market, allowing both firms and workers’ union to have
some market power.
In their study, Amoroso et al. (2012) report empirical evidence of the underes-
timation of the true level of price–cost margins caused by the omission of direct
effects of the wage bill on marginal costs. In fact, the exclusion of frictions in the
labor market (i.e., φit = 0 or Wit = W̄it) might lead to misestimating the firm’s
market power. When there is no imperfect competition in the labor market,
firms set the wage at the lowest value possible, ultimately equal to the compet-
itive wage, i.e., Wit = W̄it (and, therefore, µ
W
it = 0). For Wit that tends to W̄it,
the wage markup decreases, given that the elasticity and the share of labor are
constant, which is inversely related to the output markup η
1+η
.
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Next to the labor market rigidities, Amoroso et al. (2012) also correct for the
possible bias in the estimated coefficients when deflated gross output is used
instead of gross physical output. Defining the log deflated output as yit, this can
be rewritten as
yit = qit + (pit − p
j
t),
where pjt is the log industry price index. The firm-level price deviations (pit −
pjt) will enter the production function as an extra error component, introducing
potential correlation with the input choices. Substituting pit with the inverse
Dixit-Stiglitz demand function, and taking into account the labor input elasticity






≡ γiLt = siLt(1− µ
W
it ), (4.17)






, they estimate a log deflated revenue function that
features both labor and output market distortions:





qjt + ω̃it + ũit (4.18)
where kit, lit, mit are logs of deflated capital, labor, and deflated materials, respec-









it/η, and the measurement
error, uqit. ω̃it ≡ ωit(1 + η)/η is the productivity.
The production index is constructed as in De Loecker (2011), by proxying the
total demand for a sector j with a (market share) weighted average of deflated
revenue, qjt =
∑Nj
i msityit. Both the intercept, γ0 ≡ θ0(1 + η)/η, and the factor
elasticities of capital and material, γk ≡ θk(1 + η)/η, k = K,M are divided by
the output price markup defined as ≡ η/(1 + η) for η < −1. The elasticity of
labor is defined as in (4.17).
The firm–level productivity ωit is estimated as
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Identification of all the structural parameter of the deflated revenue function
in (4.18) is ensured by the presence of firm specific wages. To estimate all the
relevant parameters, they adopt a control function approach (Olley and Pakes,
1996) which consists in including additional regressors to capture the endogenous
part of the unobserved productivity. In particular, the productivity ω̃it can be
approximated by a third–degree polynomial (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) in
all three factor inputs kit, lit, mit. The productivity is also assumed to evolve
over time as a Markov process that depends on the firms’ investment choices,
as in (4.11). The replacement function approach allows for dynamics in the
productivity process, but restricts the investment function, and consequently
the productivity process, to be homogeneous across firms. On the other hand,
the instrumental variables approach comes at the cost of not allowing for the
possibility that the unobserved productivity could be correlated with past choices
of inputs. Therefore, for the problem at hand, we rely on the control function
approach to identify the deflated revenue function parameter, and our object
of interest, the firm level productivity. The estimation of (4.18) requires the
following moment restrictions
E(ξit + ũit|mit, kit, lit−1, mit−1, kit−1, . . . , li1, mi1, ki1) = 0,
however, identification could hold with just current values and one lag in the
conditioning set.
Results of the estimation of the deflated revenue function under imperfect compe-
tition in both output and labor markets (4.18), of the aggregate state transition
function (4.9), and of the nonlinearly persistent productivity process depend-
ing on technology upgrading (4.11) are reported and discussed in Section 4. In
the following subsection, we discuss the second step of our estimation strategy,
namely, how to retrieve the fixed costs of (cooperative) research and innovation.
4.3.2 Step 2: Profit function parameters
It is well-known that, in general, the parameters of structural dynamic program-
ming problems are not identified (Rust, 1994). Magnac and Thesmar (2002) show
that the utility functions of the firms can be identified if the distribution function
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of the unobserved preference shocks, the discount rate, and the value function
of one the alternatives (normalization) are fixed. Hence, it is theoretically pos-
sible to identify both fixed and sunk costs of R&D and innovation. However, in
practice the simultaneous identification of such costs requires enough variation in
the observed R&D investment decisions. To circumvent this problem, we recover
the fixed cost parameters within the static framework, after having estimated
the production function parameters. In particular, we consider the estimation
of the fixed costs of innovative investments as a random utility model (multino-
mial mixed logit model), where the alternative-specific utility function of firm i is
associated with the level of productivity and fixed costs represent the alternative-
specific firm-level random coefficients associated with the research ivestment k,
i.e.,
V (ait, sit, ζit; θ
FC) = ϕψηt exp(ωit)
−(1+η) − θ′FCi ait + ζit.
The error term ζit is a random term assumed to be iid extreme value distributed.
To identify θFCi , we assume that the additive separable utility shock ζit is exoge-
nous. Results of this estimation are reported in Section 5.
4.3.3 Step 3: Dynamic parameters
The main limiting factor in estimating dynamic discrete choice (DDC) models
is the computational complexity resulting form the need to compute the con-
tinuation values as in (4.14). The direct way of obtaining such continuation
values has been to compute them as the fixed point of a functional equation.
For example, Rust (1987) proposes a computational strategy named the nested
fixed point (NFXP) algorithm, which is a gradient iterative search method to
obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of the structural parameters. Unfortu-
nately, the NFXP algorithm is computationally demanding because it requires to
obtain the fixed point of a Bellman operator (hence, it must run successive iter-
ations of the value functions until convergence) for each point in the state space
of the structural parameters. Additionally, the number of state points grows
exponentially with the dimensionality of the state space. This concern about
the computational burden of implementing the NFXP algorithm, and the curse
of dimensionality, have led to a number of estimators that are computationally
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faster (Bajari et al., 2007; Pakes et al., 2007). For example, the two-step esti-
mator by Hotz and Miller (1993), using nonparametric estimates of choice and
state transition probabilities, yields a simple representation of the choice-specific
value functions for values in a neighborhood of the true vector of structural pa-
rameters.31 The main advantage of this two-step estimator is its computational
simplicity. The first step is a nonparametric regression to obtain the productivity
and the aggregate state transition functions, the second step is the estimation of
a standard discrete choice model (the policy functions) with a criterion function
that is globally concave (e.g., such as the likelihood of a multinomial logit model
in our investment choice study case). Thus, the agent’s continuation values can
be obtained nonparametrically by first estimating the agent’s choice probabilities
at each state, and then inverting the choice problem to obtain the corresponding
continuation values. However, as with other approaches, there are limitations.
First, since the two-step empirical strategy involves the (nonparametric) estima-
tion of the CCPs, the continuation values are estimated rather than computed,
and therefore they contain sampling error. This sampling error might be signif-
icant if the state space of the model is large relative to the available data. The
second limitation comes from the formal requirements of the limit properties of
the estimator. As a matter of fact, to obtain an estimator with desirable prop-
erties, the data must visit a subset of the points repeatedly. More precisely, all
the states in some recurrent class ℜ ⊆ S must be visited infinitely often, and the
equilibrium strategies must be the same every time each point of ℜ is visited.
Simply put, the two-step approach requires the assumption of stationarity. To
give an example, when forecasting the CCPs of a firm observed in year t when be-
ing active on the market in year t+τ , it is assumed that the firm at time t would
face the same decision-making environment observed in year t + τ . Moreover,
it must also be assumed that there is no permanent unobserved heterogeneity,
otherwise, it would be impossible to match the actions of the firm at time t with
the action at time t+ τ .
To correct for the finite sample bias, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) propose
a nested pseudo-likelihood algorithm (NPL) for the estimation of the class of
discrete Markov decision models with the conditional independence assumption.
31For an exhaustive, but self-contained review and description of Hotz and Miller (1993)
two-step estimator and extensions, see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010).
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In particular, their method considers a K-step extension of the Hotz and Miller
(1993) estimator. In fact, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) obtain a new esti-
mate of the CCPs given the two-step estimator and an initial nonparametric
estimator of the CCPs. Successive iterations return a sequence of estimators of
the structural parameters and CCPs that are asymptotically equivalent to the
partial MLE and to the two-step PML (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2002, Propo-
sition 4). Moreover, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) report results from Monte
Carlo experiments that illustrate how iterating in this procedure does in fact
produce significant reductions in finite sample bias. However, their estimation
algorithm have difficulties dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. Extensions
to accommodate unobserved heterogeneity via finite mixture distributions into
CCP estimation are attributable to Arcidiacono and Miller (2011).
Given these recent extensions, there is still one main limiting factor in estimat-
ing DP models, which is the computational burden associated with the iterative
process. Therefore, it is not surprising that there have been continuing efforts to
reduce the computational burden of estimating DP models. Recently, computa-
tionally practical Bayesian approaches that rely on Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods have been developed by Imai et al. (2009) and Norets (2009).
In this paper, we adopt the estimation method proposed by Imai et al. (2009).
Their algorithm is related to the one proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002),
but it is based on the full solution of the DP problem, yielding the advantage
of dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. The main idea of their estimation
approach is to avoid the computation of the full solution of the DP problem,
by approximating the expected value function at a state space point using the
average of value functions at past iterations in which the parameter vector is close
to the current parameter vector and the state variables are close to the current
state variables.32 In the conventional NFXP algorithm, most of the information
32Ching et al. (2012) claim that the practical Bayesian approach developed by Imai et al.
(2009)
“...is potentially superior to prior methods because (1) it could significantly
reduce the computational burden of solving for the DDP model in each iteration,
and (2) it produces the posterior distribution of parameter vectors, and the cor-
responding solutions for the DDP model–this avoids the need to search for the
global maximum of a complicated likelihood function.”
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obtained in the past iterations remains unused in the current iteration.
The Imai et al. (2009) algorithm consists of two loops:
1. The outer loop (Metropolis-Hasting Algorithm)
The outer loop performs a M-H (Metropolis-Hasting) algorithm. First, we
draw a candidate parameter vector from a proposal density, then we eval-
uate the likelihood, conditional on the candidate parameter vector and on
the previous iteration parameter vector, to compute the acceptance prob-
ability, with which we can decide whether or not to accept the candidate
parameter vector.
In our setting, we allow for the parameters of the profit function, θΠ, to
take different values for each firm. In particular, we assume that the vector
of firm-specific parameters θΠi follows the density function:
θΠi ∼ g(θΠi(a);µ),
where µ = (θ̄Π, σΠ)
′ is the hyperparameter vector for this density. In par-
ticular, we assume g is a normal distribution and µ includes parameters for
means, θ̄Π, and standard deviations, σΠ. Assuming that the prior of the
mean parameters is normal and that of the standard deviation parameters
is inverted Gamma, the posterior distribution for the mean parameters is
normal and that for the standard deviation parameter is inverted Gamma.
To simplify the framework, without losing the generality of the structural
model, we assume that the priors are independent across investment alter-
natives.







Let us rewrite this vector as θ = (µ′, vec(θΠ)
′, (θc)








is the vector of parameters common across firms. As for the prior on θc, we
use independent flat priors. Suppose we are at iteration r, with parameter
estimates being (µr, vec(θΠ), θc), then the outer loop iteration for drawing a
parameter vector from the posterior distribution can be divided into three
steps:
1.1 Hyperparameter updating step
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i=1), where fθ and fσ
are the conditional posterior distributions.
1.2 Data augmentation step
Now that we have effectively constructed the prior for θΠi, we draw, for
each alternative a, a candidate parameter from the proposal density,































The computation of the firm-specific likelihood component P ri , as de-
fined in (4.16), requires the computation of the expected value function
for the firm, which happens in the inner loop.
1.3 Common parameters drawing step
We draw a candidate parameter form the proposal density θ∗rc ∼
q(θ∗rc |θ
r−1
c ), then accept θ
∗r


















where (a,ω) ≡ {ai, ωi}
N
i=1, and L
r is the joint likelihood defined in
(4.15).
2. The inner loop
The inner loop computes and updates the alternative specific value func-
tion by applying the Bellman operator once. Imai et al. (2009) propose to
approximate the expected value functions by storing and using information
from earlier iterations of the algorithm. In particular, storing up toM past
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accepted draws of parameters and value functions, {θ∗l, sl, V l(sl, ǫl; θ∗l)}r−1l=r−M ,
Imai et al. (2009) propose to construct the expected value function in iter-
ation r as,
Erǫ′ [V (s
′, ǫ′; θ∗r|s, a)] =
r−1∑
l=r−M
V l(sl, ǫl; θ∗l)χ(θ∗l, θ∗r; sl, s|a), (4.19)
where








so as to assign higher weights to past parameters that are closer the current
iteration one, and higher weights to states s′ that have higher transition
density from states s. Khθ(θ
∗k, θ∗k) and Khs(s
k, s|a) are kernel function
with bandwidth hθ, and hs, for the parameter vector, θ, and the state
variable s, respectively. The value function obtained from (4.19) is used to
construct the choice specific value function,
V r(a, s, ǫ; θ∗r) = Π(a, s; θ∗rΠ ) + ǫ+ βE
r
ǫ′ [V (s
′, ǫ′; θ∗r)|s, a] . (4.20)
The value function in (4.20) is used to construct the likelihood as in (4.16).
Note that the integration over the continuous state variables is already
incorporated into the computation of the weighted average of past value
functions. This approach has the advantage, compared to Rust’s random
grid approximation, of avoiding to compute the value function at Ngrid
random points of the state variables state in each iteration.
Finally, given the assumption of iid extreme value distributed ǫ’s, we have
that
V r(s, ǫ; θ∗r) = max
a∈A




exp(V (a, s; θ∗r))
]
.
Chapter 4. R&D cooperation and innovation decisions 104
4.4 Data
In this section, we report the summary statistics of all the variables used to
estimate the static and the dynamic structural models. In particular, the upper
part of Table 4.2 displays mean, standard deviation, and number of observation of
the variables extracted from the PS (Production Survey, Statistics Netherlands)
for the years 2002-2008. To estimate the deflated revenue function as in (4.18),
we use the deflated value of gross output Yit (≡
PitQit
P̃ jt
) of each firm i in sector
j in period t, where PitQit are the firm’s revenues, and P̃
j
t is the sector j price
deflator. Labor (Lit) refers to the number of employees in each firm for each
year,33 collected in September of that year. The corresponding wagesWit include
gross wages plus salaries and social contributions before taxes. The costs of
intermediate inputs (ZitMit) include costs of energy, intermediate materials, and
services. The unit user costs Rit (of capital stock Kit) are calculated as the sum
of the depreciation of fixed assets and the interest charges. Qjt indicates the
sector-specific production index.
The nominal gross output and intermediate inputs are deflated with the appro-
priate price indices from the input-output tables available at the NACE rev. 1
two-digits sector classification.34 For capital, we use a two-digit NACE deflator of
fixed tangible assets calculated by Statistics Netherlands. The share of the cost
of labor, material, and capital are denoted as siLt, siMt, and siKt, respectively.
The share of the cost of labor constitutes 24.2 percent of the gross production
value, while materials account for 65.7 percent of gross output, and capital for 4
percent.
The total number of observation, after retaining only the respondents to the dif-
ferent waves of the Community Innovation Survey, is 8306. The CIS datasets are
the main data source for measuring innovation in Europe. The surveys are de-
signed to provide an extensive description of the general structure of innovative
activities at the sectoral, regional, and country levels, including basic information
33For each enterprise, jobs are added and adjusted for part-time and duration factors, re-
sulting in number of men/years expressed as Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)(Source: Statistics
Netherlands)
34NACE Rev. 1 is a 2-digit activity classification which was drawn up in 1989. It is a
revision of the General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the European
Communities, known by the acronym NACE and originally published by Eurostat in 1970.
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of the enterprise, product and process innovation, innovation activity and expen-
diture, effects of innovation, innovation cooperation, public finding of innovation,
source of information for innovation patents, and so forth.35
The middle part of Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the different types
of R&D expenditure extracted from three waves of the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS), carried out by Statistics Netherlands. In particular, we constructed
an unbalanced panel of survey respondents, merging the CIS 4 (reference period
2002-2004), the CIS 2006 (reference period 2004-2006), and the CIS 2008 surveys
(2006-2008). The R&D expenditures are expressed in thousands of Euros. The
intramural expenditure are more than three times larger than the extramural.
The average total amount of research expenditure is roughly 3 million Euros.
The number of firms that reported R&D spending is 2171 out the total sample
of 3565 (unevenly distributed over the period 2002-2008). The last part of Table
4.2 displays the details of the control variable, namely the investment choice k.
The most right column reports the total number of firms for each year. For
example, in 2002, the number of enterprises that participated to the CIS and
that were matched with the PS is 444 , whereas in 2008, the same matching
exercise yields a much larger number of firms, i.e., 2413. Our R&D investment
variable is constructed as follows. The firm-specific choice nait takes value one
if the firm does not engage in any activity other than operating in the market;
rdit takes value one if the firm decides to spend in R&D; the investment decision
cit takes value of one if the firm has at least one cooperative agreement (with
either a firm, a supplier, a customer, or a public (private) research institute); dit
match firms’ decision to invest in a technological upgrade; action cdit tags the
decision to both innovate and cooperate. Concerning the type of investment,
the simple production without innovative or cooperative activities is the most
frequent, with a total of 3389 observations (k = na). Introducing an innovation
(product or process, k = d), and both innovating and cooperating with either
another firm (k = cd), or with a research institute are also very frequent answers
(2129 and 2530 observation, respectively). On the other hand, the number of
firms engaging in only R&D (k = rd) or only research alliances (k = c) is quite
small, with an average of 23 and 13 firms for the rd and c investment choices,
respectively.
35Community Innovation Survey, EUROSTAT.
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The cross-sectional data from each wave is expanded so as to cover the whole
reference period (there is a one-year overlap between the three waves). For
example, if the firm has reported to have introduced an innovation during the
reference period, and the same firm has not abandoned the innovation project,
then we impute the value 1 for the whole time span.
4.5 Results
In this section we first present the parameter estimates of the deflated revenue
function under imperfect competition in both output and labor markets, (4.18),
and of the state variables evolution, (4.9), and (4.11). We then use the estimates
of the static parameters to present the results of the dynamic discrete choice
model.
4.5.1 Static parameters
The point estimates of the output price markup and all the parameters used to
construct the productivity evolution as in (4.11) are reported in Table 4.1. The
upper part of the table reports demand elasticity parameters, the aggregate state
average, and the productivity level and growth.36 The elasticity of the demand
is found to be equal to −2.8, with a corresponding output price markup of 55%.
On average, the log productivity is equal to 1.381 and its growth is equal to







1/η, where p̃jt is the price deflator for industry j at
time t, and qjt is the weighted average of deflated revenues per industry. We find
the aggregate state to be equal to 1.088, on average. Analyzing the evolution of
the aggregate state over the years, we find that the market conditions were stable
until 2006 and start worsening in 2007 and 2008. The same pattern is followed by
the total factor productivity (TFP) growth. The correlation between ψt and pro-
ductivity is 0.922 (significant at 0.001 significance level). These results confirm
36For a complete discussion on the factor input elasticities and the implication of the rent-
sharing parameter on productivity growth, we would refer the reader to the paper of Amoroso
et al. (2012).
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that, at an aggregate level, the TFP growth estimated under the assumptions of
imperfect competition in both labor and output markets seems to pick up the
actual features of the Dutch manufacturing industry.
The aggregate state transition of (4.9) is specified by the three estimated param-
eters, the mean, µ̂0 = 0.853, the autocorrelation, ρ̂ = 0.241, and the variance,
σ̂ǫ = 0.114.
Concerning the parameters of the productivity evolution as in (4.11), we find
evidence of a third order polynomial, and fair dependence on innovation and
cooperation. In particular, the estimated coefficient associated with the action
of cooperating is significant at the 5% significance level, and equal to 0.076,
and that of innovating is equal to 0.113. The coefficient associated with both
cooperating and upgrading technology, and the decision to do R&D, are equal
to 0.062 and -0.011, respectively.
The four means and standard errors of the posterior distributions of the fixed
costs are reported in Table 4.3. Assuming that all firms face the same log-normal
distribution for all four fixed costs, we find that the fixed costs of R&D and coop-
erating in R&D (3.0 and 3.5 million Euro, respectively) are substantially higher
than the per-period costs of maintaining an innovation (460 thousand Euro).
Moreover, the fixed costs of maintaining an innovative activity, while sharing
the costs of R&D, decreases the per-period costs (290 thousand Euro). This
confirms the rationale behind the cooperating strategies, i.e., the cost sharing
motive (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Lopez, 2008; Amoroso, 2011). R&D co-
operations, in fact, allow firms to share costs or to reduce risks of innovation.
The results for the fixed costs are comparable with those found by Aw et al.
(2011) for the Taiwanese electronics industry, as they estimate these costs to be
on average 67.606 million TW dollars (roughly 1.8 million Euro)
Below the posterior means and standard deviation of the fixed costs relative to
each innovative activity, we report the probabilities of undertaking the different
investments, given the level of productivity and the market conditions. On aver-
age, the probability to not engage in any activity is the highest (0.41), followed
by the probability to simultaneously cooperate and innovate (0.30), and by the
probability to introduce an innovation (0.26). Next to the averages of the prob-
ability of choosing action k, we report the same probabilities for the levels of
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the log productivity at each quartile. As we are interested in understanding the
relation between the level of productivity and the probability of undertaking an
activity, Figure 4.2 displays the locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess)37
curves fitting the relationships between the probabilities to undertake action a
and the level of productivity, exp(ωit). The darker areas of the smoothed scatter-
plots represent higher density of the data points. The plot at the top reports the
curve fitting the relation between the probability of taking no action and the level
of productivity. The probability of remaining inactive in research and innovation
is inversely related to the productivity. We find the same pattern for the prob-
ability of doing R&D and the probability of introducing an innovation. Simply
put, the higher the firm level productivity, the smaller the probability of investing
in R&D, or innovating. However, the situation is reversed when the investment
in R&D or in a new product or process is shared with a partner. Indeed, when
cooperating, the probabilities of doing research, Pr(a = c|s, θ), and innovating,
Pr(a = cd|s, θ), are (non monotonic) increasing functions of productivity. This
pattern could point to the presence of knowledge externalities. These results,
together with the evidence of the endogenous firm-level productivity, positively
associated with the action of cooperating, suggest that an innovation policy aim-
ing at encouraging research cooperation might result in a virtuous cycle. Indeed,
past investments in cooperative research have a positive impact on current pro-
ductivity, which, in turn, positively influence the probability to engage in both
R&D and innovation when these activities are shared with a research partner.
Figure 4.3 plots the MCMC draws of the fixed cost parameters. It appears that
the the MCMC draws converge after 50 iterations.
4.5.2 Dynamic parameters
In this section we present the results for the DDPmodel presented in (4.13). Once
the fixed costs are estimated, we can subtract them from the profit function as in
(4.7). For simplicity, we estimate the model without unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, the standard deviations σΠ are set equal to zero. The discount factor
37Locally weighted regression fitting techniques provide a generally smooth curve, the value
of which at a particular location along the x-axis is determined only by the points in that
vicinity. The method consequently makes no assumptions about the form of the relationship,
and allows the form to be discovered using the data itself.
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is fixed at 0.93. During this stage we are able to recover both fixed and sunk
costs of doing R&D or innovating with or without a research partner. Figure 4.3
shows that the sunk cost parameters converge at different rates, and, in general,
much slower than the fixed costs.
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 4.4. Next to the mean values
of the sunk costs, we report the standard deviations of the MCMC draws. The
values are estimated with the expected signs. Sunk costs are found to be 4
millions for the average firm that undertakes R&D with or without a partner, 14
to 33% higher than the fixed costs. The sunk costs of innovation are still much
smaller than the ones of research, but 3 to 3.5 times higher than the fixed costs
of innovating. Moreover, we find additional evidence of the risk-sharing motive
behind the decision to introduce an innovation. In fact, the average sunk costs
of producing an innovation with a research partner is almost one third smaller
than the average sunk costs of undertaking the same project without an alliance
(997,000 Euro and 1.4 million Euro, respectively). The sunk costs parameters
cannot be compared with the reported R&D expenditures. This is because the
sunk costs can be related to productive factors, such as labor and/or capital that
are allocated to research rather than to production. For this reason, these costs
will not appear in the balance sheets of the company (Santos, 2009).
Next to the estimation of the sunk cost parameters, we show the importance
of the role played by these costs in shaping the probabilities if undertaking the
different research investments. Table 4.4 also reports the changes in probabilities
associated with 50% and 25% reductions in the costs of engaging in research
and/or innovating. A reduction in the sunk costs of R&D, cooperating, and
innovating can be thought of as an example of an innovation policy, such as
a subsidy to R&D start up, or public procurement. Results show that a 25%
reduction in these costs is expected to increase the probability of undertaking
the corresponding activity. For example, reducing the costs of R&D, θSCi (rd) of
25% leads to an increase of probability of doing R&D of 62.2%.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present empirical evidence of the fixed and sunk costs of invest-
ments in research activities, and quantify the linkages between the cost structure,
firm-level productivity, and the probabilities to technologically upgrade. In par-
ticular, we propose and estimate a structural model with endogenous choices
of technological upgrade for the Dutch manufacturing industry. The model de-
scribes a firm’s dynamic decision process for undertaking different research ac-
tivities, namely, innovating and conducting R&D, with or without a research
partner. The R&D investment choices are endogenous, as they depend on the
firm’s level of productivity, an aggregate measure of industry competition, fixed
and sunk costs of R&D, and past research choices. To our knowledge, none of
the existing studies proposes and estimates a dynamic structural model to derive
the total cost function of firms engaging in technological activities.
We find that the firm’s probability to do R&D or to introduce an innovation
increases with the level of productivity, only when this activity is shared with
a research partner. Moreover, according to the literature on R&D cooperation,
the costs of innovating are smaller when cooperating. In fact, given the higher
risks associated with the uncertainty of the market demand for new products
or processes, the firm might allocate more importance to the cost/risk sharing
rationale for this type of innovative activities, rather than for the sheer research
investments.
Sunk costs are found to be roughly 1.5 times larger than the fixed costs of research
(both cooperative and private), and 3 to 3.5 times larger than the fixed costs of
innovating. Moreover, we show the importance of the role played by these costs
in shaping the probabilities if undertaking the different research investments.
In general, a reduction in the sunk costs of R&D, cooperating, and innovating
increases the probability of undertaking the corresponding activity.
Additionally, we present some preliminary conclusions on innovation policies
aiming at encouraging research cooperation. We show how these type of pol-
icy interventions might result in a virtuous cycle. Indeed, past investments in
cooperative research have a positive impact on current productivity, which, in
turn, positively influences the probability to engage in both R&D and innovation
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when these activities are shared with a research partner. Therefore, in elaborat-
ing their policies for innovation, governments must ensure to create frameworks
that encourage the collaboration throughout the innovation process.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Profit function
Given the following maximization problem
max
Lit,Wit
[φit log(Uit(Wit, Lit)) + (1− φit) logΠit] ,
the first order conditions can be written as:
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The short-run profits, PitQit −WitLit, can be rewritten as























Replacing the labor demand with (4.24), we get the final profit function:



























, and δ ≡ η/(η − θiLt(η − 1)).
The short-run profit function as in (4.8), assuming no imperfect competition on





itXit | AitF (Xit) ≥ Qit} , (4.25)
where Xit ≡ (Xi1t, Xi2t, . . . , Xirt)
′ denotes the vector of r factor inputs, F (.) is
production function, and Vit ≡ (Vi1t, Vi2t, . . . , Virt)
′ is the vector of r input prices.







since MCXit = Vit
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Multiplying (4.26) by PitQit, we obtain the profits, therefore the profit function





Substituting Qit with (4.1) and Pit with (4.27), we obtain the following short-run
profit function:
Π(ωit, ψt) = ϕψt exp(ωit)
−(1+η),







Chapter 4. R&D cooperation and innovation decisions 115
4.7.2 Tables and Figures




























































Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
mean sd median 1st quartile 3rd quartile N. obs
PitQit 63323.97(K Euros) 318679 14881.500 5838.000 39925 8306
Lit 152.657 347.055 75 36 152 8306
ZitMit 48353.050(K Euros) 280848 9868 3539 27120 8306
RitKit 2255.667(K Euros) 26330 359 117 1156 8257
siLt 0.242 0.124 0.228 0.154 0.310
siMt 0.657 0.149 0.663 0.567 0.758
siKt 0.040 0.223 0.027 0.013 0.048
Qjt 73.080 10.465 73.498 63.648 80.889 8306
Intramural R&D 1806.574(K Euros) 18396.654 100 10 400 4937
Extramural R&D 612.855(K Euros) 7243.232 0 0 50 4937
R&D Expenditure 3038.461(K Euros) 26356.650 255 63 846 4937
k = na k = rd k = c k = d k = cd Nt
N2002 153 22 9 136 124 444
N2003 133 9 7 102 167 418
N2004 175 13 6 131 221 546
N2005 179 8 3 130 184 504
N2006 769 28 15 471 557 1840
N2007 907 38 26 553 617 2141
N2008 1073 46 28 606 660 2413
Tot. 3389 164 94 2129 2530 8306
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Table 4.3: Fixed costs
posterior mean(×1mln) std error
θFCi (rd) 3.025 0.082
θFCi (c) 3.528 0.100
θFCi (d) 0.459 0.025
θFCi (cd) 0.286 0.025
mean ωit ≤ 1.172 ωit ≤ 1.347 ωit ≤ 1.541
Pi(a = na|s, θ) 0.408 0.409 0.415 0.414
Pi(a = rd|s, θ) 0.020 0.024 0.021 0.021
Pi(a = c|s, θ) 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.011
Pi(a = d|s, θ) 0.256 0.269 0.263 0.260
Pi(a = cd|s, θ) 0.304 0.288 0.289 0.293
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Figure 4.2: Investment policy functions
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Table 4.4: Dynamic Parameter Estimates
posterior mean std error
θSCi (rd) 3.984 0.570
θSCi (c) 4.046 0.216
θSCi (d) 1.433 0.560
θSCi (cd) 0.997 0.216
θSCi (rd) -50% -25% 0%
Pi(a = na|s, θ) 0.141 0.264 0.367
Pi(a = rd|s, θ) 0.049 0.630 0.008
Pi(a = c|s, θ) 0.037 0.006 0.009
Pi(a = d|s, θ) 0.002 0.048 0.390
Pi(a = cd|s, θ) 0.770 0.051 0.226
θSCi (c) -50% -25% 0%
Pi(a = na|s, θ) 0.484 0.693 ”
Pi(a = rd|s, θ) 0.006 0.002 ”
Pi(a = c|s, θ) 0.065 0.008 ”
Pi(a = d|s, θ) 0.263 0.109 ”
Pi(a = cd|s, θ) 0.182 0.188 ”
θSCi (d) -50% -25% 0%
Pi(a = na|s, θ) 0.668 0.433 ”
Pi(a = rd|s, θ) 0.002 0.005 ”
Pi(a = c|s, θ) 0.002 0.007 ”
Pi(a = d|s, θ) 0.225 0.407 ”
Pi(a = cd|s, θ) 0.103 0.147 ”
θSCi (cd) -50% -25% 0%
Pi(a = na|s, θ) 0.616 0.541 ”
Pi(a = rd|s, θ) 0.007 0.003 ”
Pi(a = c|s, θ) 0.004 0.004 ”
Pi(a = d|s, θ) 0.129 0.162 ”
Pi(a = cd|s, θ) 0.244 0.290 ”
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Figure 4.3: MCMC iterations of fixed and sunk cost parameters




























Note: MCMC plots of θFC and θSC
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